Battle of Gaza (2007)

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The Battle of Gaza, also referred to as Hamas' takeover of Gaza, was a military conflict between Fatah and Hamas, that took place in the Gaza Strip between the 10th and 15th of June 2007. It was a climax in the Fatah–Hamas conflict, centered on the struggle for power, after Fatah lost the parliamentary elections of 2006. Hamas fighters took control of the Gaza Strip[1] and removed Fatah officials. The battle resulted in the dissolution of the unity government and the de facto division of the Palestinian territories into two entities, the West Bank governed by the Palestinian National Authority, and Gaza governed by Hamas.

The ICRC estimated that at least 118 people were killed and more than 550 wounded during the fighting in the week up to 15 June.[2]

Background

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Palestinian Authority

The conflict between Fatah and Hamas had been simmering since Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006. After Hamas' victory, Fatah refused to join a grand coalition.[3][4][5]

Abbas was under pressure from the international community, who considered Hamas unacceptable. Therefore, the international community decided to sanction and boycott the Hamas-led government by severing diplomatic ties and halting financial aid until Hamas would fulfill certain conditions. It was suggested that Mahmoud Abbas could use his constitutional powers to dismiss the government and call for new elections, which were intended to yield a different result and reinstall Fatah in power on the grounds that the Palestinian electorate would perceive Hamas as a failure.[5][6]

On 30 January 2006, the Quartet (United States, Russia, United Nations, and European Union) predicated future foreign assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) on the future government's commitment to non-violence, recognition of the State of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. Hamas rejected these demands,[7] establishing the Palestinian government of March 2006, which resulted in the Quartet suspension of its foreign assistance program, and Israel imposed economic sanctions. The US and Israel attempted to undermine Hamas and force it from power while strengthening the position of President Abbas.[8][9]

The new government clashed with President Abbas, who shared power with it based on the Basic Law. Through presidential decrees, Abbas took exclusive presidential authority over several administrative powers and periodically made threats of dismissal.[5]

After refusing to accept the plan of the Hamas-led PA government to reform the security sector loyal to Abbas and Fatah, Abbas placed the security forces under his direct control and built up his own Presidential Guard. Hamas then created a parallel security force, which was made up of its own members of the al-Qassam Brigades. The two forces refused to cooperate. Hamas’ forces represented a tradition of armed resistance, whereas those of Fatah's were committed to the upholding of the Oslo Accords.[5]

Preceding confrontations

By 2007, Hamas was unable to pay salaries or get recognition from European donor countries and international organisations. This led to the first fighting between Hamas and Fatah.[10] In the last month of 2006, factional fighting left 33 people dead. On 7 January 2007, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas ordered the Hamas-led Interior Ministry's paramilitary police force, the most powerful armed unit outside his control in the factional fighting, to be incorporated into the security apparatus loyal to him. The ministry responded with defiance, announcing plans to double the size of its force. The combative announcements raised the prospect of an intensified armed standoff. Abbas' only means of enforcing the order appeared to be coercive action by police and security units under his command, but they were relatively weak in the Gaza Strip, Hamas's stronghold.[11]

External involvement

Documents published in Palestine Papers reveal the British intelligence MI6, helped draw up a security plan for Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. The plan mentioned as objective "encourage and enable the Palestinian Authority (PA) to fully meet its security obligations under Phase 1 of the Roadmap". It proposes a number of ways of "degrading the capabilities of rejectionists", naming Hamas, PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and the Fatah-linked al-Aqsa Brigades.[12] The plan was described by the Guardian as a "wide-ranging crackdown on Hamas".[13]

In 2004, the plan was passed to Jibril Rajoub, a senior Fatah official of the PA. The bulk of the plan has since been carried out.[13][14] Issues noted in the plan were suicide bombing, weapons smuggling, Qassam rockets and "terror finance". Its most controversial section recommended that "Degrading the capabilities of the rejectionists – Hamas, PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] and the [Fatah-linked] Al Aqsa Brigades – through the disruption of their leaderships' communications and command and control capabilities; the detention of key middle-ranking officers; and the confiscation of their arsenals and financial resources". Suggesting temporary internment of leaders and activists, the closure of radio stations and the replacement of imams in mosques.[13][14][15]

After 2006 elections, Hamas announced the formation of its own security service, the Executive Force, appointing Jamal Abu Samhadana, a prominent militant, at its head. Abbas had denounced the move as unconstitutional, saying that only the Palestinian president could command armed forces.[16] U.S. training program began after that.[17] According to Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, the U.S. security coordinator "We are involved in building up the Presidential Guard, instructing it, assisting it to build itself up and giving them ideas. We are not training the forces to confront Hamas," adding that "Hamas is receiving money and arms from Iran and possibly Syria, and we must make sure that the moderate forces will not be erased,".[16]

The American effort was part of a broader international package proposed to the Quartet to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian security forces as Hamas threatens to increase its parallel Executive Force to 6,000 men. Training for Fatah Presidential Guard was provided by Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Additional non-lethal equipment and fund for the purchase of arms were provided. Israel, too, allowed light arms to flow to members of the Presidential Guard, though Jordan and Egypt[11][16][18][19][20][21][22]

Israel's Security Agency supported President Abbas and the Presidential Guard, but was concerned about the weakness of Fatah. There was a plan to add the PLO's Jordan-based Badr Brigade to the Presidential Guard.[17] As of October 2006, "while clashes between Hamas and elements of Fatah had been fierce", Israel Security Agency Director Yuval Diskin did not believe the Palestinians were on the verge of a civil war because neither side wanted one, but "should something happen to Haniyeh on the Hamas side, or Mohammed Dahlan or Rashid Abu Shabak on the Fatah side, anything could happen."[17]

According to the IISS, the June 2007 escalation was triggered by Hamas' conviction that the PA's Presidential Guard, loyal to Mahmoud Abbas, was being positioned to take control of Gaza. The US had helped build up the Presidential Guard to 3,500 men since August 2006.[18]

Plan to replace government

As the Hamas-led government met with Israeli opposition and international sanctions, Abbas and Fatah-dominated PLO developed a plan to replace the Hamas government with one accepted by Israel and the international community. According to the plan, unveiled in Al Jazeera's Palestine Papers, a National Unity Government or a government of technocrats would be formed by the end of November to prepare early presidential and legislative elections by mid-2007. If the establishment of a government meeting the Quartet conditions would fail, President Abbas would announce a state of emergency, dismiss the present cabinet and form an emergency government, or call for early elections. The developers of the plan were aware of the problem that an emergency government legally could govern only for 1 month without PLC vote of confidence. An "Action Plan Leading to Early Elections" envisioned a strong enlargement of Fatah's Presidential Guard, internal reform of Fatah, empowering of presidential institutions, resumption of aid by the international community through the President’s Office, and end of the illegal withhold of taxes by Israel.[23]

By October 2006, the US administration, Israel, many Arab governments, and much of Fatah – including most of Abbas’ key advisors still held the view that if Hamas does not unambiguously accept the Quartet’s conditions, it should and can be forced out of power through early elections, its dismissal and appointment of an emergency government or a popular referendum seeking Palestinian agreement to the Quartet’s conditions. The plan was also put forward by US President Bush in his meeting with Abbas on 20 September 2006.[24]

The plan was largely carried out:

Elections were, however, never held. Already in December 2006, Abbas announced a plan for early elections not be held until mid-2007, provoking high tensions and some clashes between Hamas and Fatah supporters.[25] In July 2007, he again called for early elections.[26] Other calls were in October 2009[27] and in February 2011.[28]

The battle

On 10 June 2007, the Fatah–Hamas conflict culminated in clashes, between the Fatah-allied forces on one side and the Hamas-allied forces on the other side. Major Fatah forces were the National Security Forces, notably the "Presidential Guard". Main force of Hamas was the "Executive Force".

Hamas militants seized several Fatah members and threw one of them, Mohammed Sweirki, an officer in the elite Palestinian Presidential Guard, off the top of the tallest building in Gaza, a 15-story apartment building. In retaliation, Fatah militants attacked and killed the imam of the city's Great Mosque, Mohammed al-Rifati. They also opened fire on the home of Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. Just before midnight, a Hamas militant was thrown off a 12-story building.[29]

On 11 June, the residences of both Mahmoud Abbas, Fatah's leader and the Palestinian Authority president, and of then-Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, of Hamas, were targeted with gun and shell fire.[30]

On 12 June, Hamas began attacking posts held by their Fatah faction rivals. Hundreds of Hamas fighters had moved on the positions after giving their occupants two hours to leave. A major Fatah base in the northern town of Jabaliya fell to Hamas fighters, witnesses told AFP news agency. Heavy fighting also raged around the main Fatah headquarters in Gaza City, with Hamas militants attacking with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons.[31]

On 13 June, Hamas seized the headquarters of the Fatah-controlled National Security Forces in northern Gaza. Gunmen fought for control of high-rise buildings serving as sniper positions and Hamas said it had bulldozed a Fatah outpost controlling Gaza's main north-south road. Also on that day, an explosion wrecked the Khan Younis headquarters of the Fatah-linked Preventive Security Service, killing five people.[32]

On 14 June, Hamas gunmen completed the takeover of the central building of the Palestinian Preventive Security Service's headquarters in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas members took over vehicles and weapons in the compound, which was considered the Palestinian Authority's main symbol in the Strip. The Preventive Security Service cooperated with Israel in the past, and has been armed by the United States.[33] It has been identified with Fatah powerhouse Mohammed Dahlan, who has become a figure hated by the Islamists in Gaza.[33] The gunmen who entered the compound held a prayer there and waved a flag on the building's rooftop. At least 10 people were killed. Hamas TV broadcast a display of weapons inside the building, as well as jeeps, mortar shells and bulletproof vests seized in the compound, which according to Hamas, were smuggled to Fatah by Israel and the Americans in the past few months through the border with Egypt.[34]

Hamas members held a prayer in the compound, which they referred to as the "heresy compound." Hamas also changed the name of the neighborhood where the building is located from "Tel al-Hawa" to "Tel al-Islam."[34]

On the afternoon of 14 June, the Associated Press reported an explosion that rocked Gaza City. According to Fatah officials, security forces withdrew from their post and blew it up in order to not let Hamas take it over. The security forces afterwards repositioned to another location. Later on 14 June, Hamas also took control of the southern Gaza Strip city Rafah which lies near an already closed border crossing with Egypt, which is monitored by Israeli, Palestinian and European Union security forces. The EU staff had, at that time, already been relocated to the Israeli city of Ashkelon for safety reasons.[35] On 14 June Abbas dissolved the Palestinian-Hamas unity government, on 15 June, Hamas completed the control over Gaza.[36]

Alleged military coup

As a result of the battle, Hamas got complete control of Gaza. The pro-Fatah view is, that it was a plain military coup by Hamas. The pro-Hamas view is, that the US drew up a plan to arm Fatah cadres with the aim of forcefully removing Hamas from power in Gaza. According to the pro-Hamas view, Fatah fighters, led by commander Mohammed Dahlan with logistical support from the US Central Intelligence Agency, were planning to carry out a bloody coup against Hamas.[37] Then, Hamas pre-emptively took control over Gaza.

In an April 2008 article in Vanity Fair magazine, the journalist David Rose published confidential documents, apparently originating from the US State Department, which would prove that the United States collaborated with the Palestinian Authority and Israel to attempt the violent overthrow of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and that Hamas pre-empted the coup. The documents suggest that a government with Hamas should meet the demands of the Middle East Quartet, otherwise President Mahmoud Abbas should declare a state of emergency, which effectively would dissolve the current unity government, or the government should collapse by other means.[38][39] Rose quotes former Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief Middle East adviser David Wurmser, accusing the Bush administration of “engaging in a dirty war in an effort to provide a corrupt dictatorship [led by Abbas] with victory.” He believes that Hamas had no intention of taking Gaza until Fatah forced its hand. “It looks to me that what happened wasn’t so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen”[39]

According to Alastair Crooke, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided in 2003 to tie UK and EU security policy in the West Bank and Gaza to a US-led counter-insurgency against Hamas. This led to an internal policy contradiction that pre-empted the EU from mounting any effective foreign policy on the "peace process" alternative to that of the US. At a political level, the EU "talked the talk" of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian state-building and democracy. At the practical level, the EU "walked the walk" of disruption, detention, seizing finances, and destroying the capabilities of one [Hamas] of the two factions and prevented the parliament from exercising any function.[40]

According to Crooke, the Quartet conditions for engagement with Hamas, which the EU had endorsed after the 2006 elections, were conditions raised precisely in order to prevent Hamas from meeting them, rather than as guidelines intended to open the path for diplomatic solutions. Then, British and American intelligence services were preparing a "soft" coup to remove Hamas from power in Gaza.[40]

Violations of international law

Human Rights Watch accused both sides of violating international humanitarian law, in some instances amounting to war crimes.[42] The accusations include targeting and killing civilians, public executions of political opponents and captives, throwing prisoners off high-rise apartment buildings, fighting in hospitals, and shooting from a jeep marked with "TV" insignia.[41] The International Committee of the Red Cross denounced attacks in and around two hospitals in the northern part of the Gaza strip.[43]

During the fighting several incidents of looting took place: a crowd took furniture, wall tiles and personal belongings from the villa of the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat;[44] the home of former Fatah commander Mohammed Dahlan was also looted: "An AFP correspondent witnessed dozens of Palestinians taking everything they could carry from Dahlan's villa – furniture, pot plants and even the kitchen sink, complete with plumbing fixtures such as taps,";[45] and at the Muntada, Abbas's seafront presidential compound, witnesses reported seeing Hamas fighters remove computers, documents and guns.[45]

Aftermath

Division of government

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On 14 June 2007, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, reacted to the Hamas takeover by announcing the dissolution of the current unity government and declaring state of emergency.[46][47] Abbas dismissed the serving Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, and installed Salam Fayyad in his place.[48] Haniyeh has refused to accept his dismissal and has accused Abbas of participating in a US-led plot to overthrow him.[48] Experts in Palestinian law and independent members of the PLC have questioned the legality of the Fayyad government.[49] According to the Palestinian Basic Law, the President can dismiss the Prime Minister but the dismissed government continues to function as a caretaker government until a new government is formed and receives a vote of confidence from an absolute majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council.[49][50] The Hamas-majority PLC has never met to confirm the Fayyad government.[49]

With the dissolution of the Hamas-led unity government, the territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority was de facto divided into two entities: the Hamas-controlled government of the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, governed by the Palestinian National Authority.[51]

The international community smoothly recognized an emergency government installed by Abbas by presidential decree. Within days, the US recognized Abbas' government and ended a 15-month economic and political boycott of the Palestinian Authority in a bid to bolster President Abbas and the new Fatah-led government. The European Union similarly announced plans to resume direct aid to the Palestinians, while Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel said it would release to Abbas Palestinian tax revenues that Israel had withheld since Hamas took control of the Palestinian Parliament.[52] The Middle East Quartet reiterated their continued support to Abbas and resume of normal relations with the Fatah-led PA. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged international support for Abbas's efforts "to restore law and order".[48][53] Israel and Egypt began a blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Possible religious consequences

A Hamas spokesman in Gaza, Fouzi Barhoum, said earlier that Hamas was imposing Islamic law in Gaza but this was denied by exiled Hamas leader Khaled Mashal.[54]

Sheik Abu Saqer, leader of Jihadia Salafiya, an Islamic outreach movement that recently announced the opening of a "military wing" to enforce Muslim law in Gaza. "I expect our Christian neighbors to understand the new Hamas rule means real changes. They must be ready for Islamic rule if they want to live in peace in Gaza."[55] The sole Christian bookstore in Gaza was attacked and the owner murdered.[56]

Weapons

Hamas has captured thousands of small arms and eight armored combat vehicles supplied by the United States,[citation needed] Egypt, and Jordan[57] to the Palestinian Authority.

According to Muhammad Abdel-El of the Hamas-allied Popular Resistance Committees, Hamas and its allies have captured quantities of foreign intelligence, including CIA files. Abu Abdullah of Hamas' "military wing", the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, claims Hamas will make portions of the documents public, in a stated attempt to expose covert relations between the United States and "traitor" Arab countries.[citation needed]

While Hamas collected most of the 15,000 weapons registered to the former security forces, it failed to collect more than a fraction of the 400,000 weapons that are in the hands of various clans, and said that it would not touch weapons used for fighting Israel, only those that might be used against Hamas.[58]

Notes

  1. Guardian, 15 June 2007, Hamas takes control of Gaza
  2. Gaza-Westbank – ICRC Bulletin No. 22 / 2007, AlertNet. Retrieved 16 June 2007.
  3. Palestinian PM to quit after poll. BBC, 26 January 2006
  4. Chronological Review of Events Relating to the Question of Palestine Monthly media monitoring review, January 2006. UN, Division for Palestinian Rights, 8 February 2006.
    Day 26: "Saeb Erakat, who won re-election to the PLC in his home town of Jericho, beating back a challenge from a Hamas candidate, said his party did not want to join a Hamas Government. ... “The Fatah Central Committee has decided that Fatah will not join the next Government,” Intissar Wazir, a member of the Committee, said after the group met to discuss the outcome of the PLC elections. Officials said the ultimate decision on whether Fatah could join a new Government would still depend on PA President Abbas." Day 29: "After talks with PA President Abbas, PLC deputies from Fatah confirmed that their faction would not join Hamas in a coalition Government and would prefer to sit in opposition, despite calls by Hamas for a “political partnership”."
  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 The Impact of Semi-Presidentialism on Governance in the Palestinian Authority (pdf), pp. 11-14. Francesco Cavatorta and Robert Elgie. Parliam Affairs (2009). (Also in html version)
  6. Inducing a Failed State in Palestine, pp. 13-14. Yezid Sayigh, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Survival | vol. 49 no. 3 | Autumn 2007 | pp. 7–40; DOI 10.1080/00396330701564786
  7. CRS Report for Congress, 27 June 2006, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians
  8. U.S. and Israelis Are Said to Talk of Hamas Ouster.. New York Times, 14 February 2006. "recognize Israel's right to exist, forswear violence and accept previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements ... or face isolation and collapse."
  9. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  10. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  11. 11.0 11.1 Abbas outlaws Hamas's paramilitary Executive Force. Richard Boudreaux, The Boston Globe/Los Angeles Times, 7 January 2007
  12. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  13. 13.0 13.1 13.2 Palestine papers reveal MI6 drew up plan for crackdown on Hamas. Ian Black and Seumas Milne, Guardian, 25 January 2011
  14. 14.0 14.1 Palestine papers: MI6 plan proposed internment – and hotline to Israelis. Ian Black and Seumas Milne, Guardian, 25 January 2011
  15. UK Security Plan: British MI6 Palestinian Security Plan with Annex, 2003. On [1]
  16. 16.0 16.1 16.2 U.S. training Fatah in anti-terror tactics, San Francisco Chronicle, 14 December 2006
  17. 17.0 17.1 17.2 US embassy cables: Israel discusses Gaza and West Bank with US. Guardian, 23 January 2011.
    ″LTG Dayton briefed Diskin on USSC efforts to bolster the Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF.)″
    ″[Israel Security Agency Director Yuval] Diskin told the USSC that he continued to support the strengthening of President Abbas and the Presidential Guard, but noted that it was more important to strengthen Fatah as a movement than focus on bolstering Abbas' personal position.″
    ″Diskin told the USSC that he did not have any objections to the [Palestinian Liberation Army's Jordan-based Badr] Brigade's proposed deployment to North Gaza″
    ″Diskin presented an analysis of the security situation in Gaza and the West Bank and told the USSC that while clashes between Hamas and elements of Fatah had been fierce, he did not believe the Palestinians were on the verge of a civil war because neither side wanted one...Diskin caveated his assessment with a warning that, should something happen to Haniyeh on the Hamas side, or Mohammed Dahlan or Rashid Abu Shabak on the Fatah side, anything could happen.″
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 Hamas coup in Gaza (pdf), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Volume 13, Issue 5; June 2007. Also in html.
  19. 19.0 19.1 Israel, US, and Egypt back Fatah's fight against Hamas, Christian Science Monitor, 25 May 2007
  20. Diplomats fear US wants to arm Fatah for 'war on Hamas'. Stephen Farrell, The Times, 18 November 2006. On web.archive.org
  21. Israeli defense official: Fatah arms transfer bolsters forces of peace, Haaretz, 28 December 2006
  22. Six killed in Hamas ambush on Gaza convoy. Nidal al-Mughrabi, Reuters, 1 February 2007. On web.archive.org
  23. Palestinian Vision for Resolving the Current PA Crisis (Draft #6). The Palestine Papers, 30 October 2006. Here available
  24. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: To Reach a Lasting Peace, pp. 3-4. Crisis Group Middle East Report N°58, 5 October 2006. Source
  25. Palestinian tensions run high after poll call. Reuters, 17 December 2006
  26. Abbas backs elections, denounces Hamas ′coup′. AP, 19 July 2007
  27. Mahmoud Abbas calls January 24 elections. AFP, 24 October 2009
  28. Palestinian Leaders Suddenly Call for Elections. New York Times, 12 February 2011
  29. Haaretz/Associated Press, 10 June 2007, Palestinian gunmen target Haniyeh's home in Gaza. On web.archive.org
  30. Abraham Rabinovich, Deadly escalation in Fatah-Hamas feud. The Australian, 12 June 2007. On web.archive.org
  31. Hamas launches new Gaza attacks, BBC News Online, 12 June 2007.
  32. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named bbc-battle
  33. 33.0 33.1 A pyrrhic victory, The Guardian, 16 June 2007.
  34. 34.0 34.1 We'll execute Fatah leaders, Israel News, 14 June 2007.
  35. Update, cnn.com.
  36. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  37. This ‘Bombshell’ Took a Year Falling. Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani, Inter Press Service, 2 April 2008
  38. 1. Talking points. US State Department, date unknown; 2. Plan B. US State Department, 2007; 3. An action plan for the Palestinian Presidency. US State Department, 2 March 2007
  39. 39.0 39.1 The Gaza Bombshell. David Rose, Vanity Fair, April 2008. Original without links.
  40. 40.0 40.1 Blair's counter-insurgency "surge". Alastair Crooke, Aljazeera, 25 January 2011
  41. 41.0 41.1 Gaza: Armed Palestinian Groups Commit Grave Crimes, Human Rights Watch, June 13, 2007. Archived 15 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine
  42. Armed Palestinian Groups Commit Grave Crimes, HRW via BBSNews, New York, 14 June 2007.
  43. Hospitals offer no safety in Gaza strip, ABC News, 13 June 2007.
  44. Crowd loots Gaza home of Arafat, Ali Waked and Reuters, 16 June 2007.
  45. 45.0 45.1 Hamas goes on Gaza looting spree, IOL, 15 June 2007.
  46. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  47. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  48. 48.0 48.1 48.2 Gaza on the Boil, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), S. Samuel C. Rajiv, 21 June 2007
  49. 49.0 49.1 49.2 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  50. Framers of Palestinian constitution challenge Abbas. Adam Entous, Reuters, 8 July 2007
  51. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  52. U.S. ends embargo on Palestinian Authority in move to bolster Fatah. Helene Cooper, International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2007
  53. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  54. Hamas controls Gaza, says it will stay in power
  55. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  56. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  57. Hamas seizes US-financed weapons, equipment, Middle East Newsline, 14 June 2007.
  58. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.

External links

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