Fliegerführer Atlantik

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Fliegerführer Atlantik
Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1978-043-02, Focke-Wulf Fw 200 C Condor.jpg
A Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor, the main threat to Atlantic convoys from the air
Active 1941–44
Country Germany
Allegiance  Nazi Germany
Branch Luftwaffe
Type Luftflotte
Role Anti-shipping and naval interdiction operations
Size Air Fleet
Engagements First Happy Time
Operation Rheinübung
Operation Berlin
Last battle of the battleship Bismarck
Second Happy Time
Battle honours Second World War
(Battle of the Atlantic)
Commanders
Notable
commanders		 Martin Harlinghausen

Fliegerführer Atlantik (German: "Flyer Command Atlantic") was a World War II Luftwaffe naval command dedicated to maritime patrol.

At the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Luftwaffe was an effective air force and contributed substantially to the success of the German army. Between the wars the German military had not developed naval aviation. There existed a shortage of naval aircraft with the necessary capabilities required to reconnoiter the seas in cooperation with Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine or engage merchant vessels belonging to the Western Allies. By 1940, the Wehrmacht occupied much of Western Europe and Scandinavia. The Kriegsmarine and its commander-in-chief Erich Raeder saw this as an opportunity to destroy the sea communications of the United Kingdom, Germany's last significant opponent in Europe. Eventually, after much dispute, the German naval staff received an air support command named Fliegerführer Atlantik for the task of interdiction and reconnaissance.

In February 1941, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) was ordered by Adolf Hitler to form a naval air command to support the Kriegsmarine's U-boat operations in the Battle of the Atlantic.[1] Though reluctant, the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, agreed to the formation of the specialised naval command which would remain under the operational control of the Luftwaffe. It was subordinated to Luftflotte 3, commanded by Hugo Sperrle.[1] The command had jurisdiction over all Luftwaffe operations in the Atlantic and supported German surface raiders and submarines attacking Western Allied shipping in the Atlantic Ocean, English Channel and Irish Sea. The organisation's first commanding officer was Martin Harlinghausen.

The command flew in action and achieved considerable success in 1941. British shipping losses rose. Prime Minister Winston Churchill referred to Fliegerführer Atlantik and its main weapon of war, the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor, as the "scourge of the Atlantic". Nevertheless, at the close of that year British and Allied countermeasures tamed the threat from long-range German aircraft. As the battles in the Atlantic intensified in 1942 and 1943 the command made continuous demands for aircraft and crews. Now engaged heavily in other theatres, the Luftwaffe could not afford the resources for Atlantic operations.

By 1944 Fliegerführer Atlantik acted as a protective shield providing air superiority support to the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay against its contemporary, RAF Coastal Command. By August 1944 Fliegerführer Atlantik and the U-boats had ceased to be effective. German naval aircraft engaged the D-Day landings which opened up the Western Front in Normandy once more. The command was disbanded in September 1944 when the German front in France collapsed.

Naval air doctrine

The Imperial German Navy (German: Kaiserliche Marine) had conducted successful aerial operations in the North Sea in World War I. The German Naval Air Corps (German: Marinefliegerkorps) was successful in gaining air superiority and effective in anti-shipping operations. Despite battling bravely in the war the service, unlike the German Army, lacked a major victory. The Army's success in contrast could be traced back to the Napoleonic Wars and there was a tradition in learning from past experiences. When the Reichsmarine was instituted by the Weimar Government (1919–1933), German naval officers were conscious of their wartime record and their status as the junior service. All of this contributed to the reluctance to undertake an examination of naval air operations. By 1921 the Reichsmarine possessed only 15 pilots.[2]

Inter-service rivalry also hampered the development of German naval air doctrine. The Navy was unwilling to cooperate too closely with the army in aerial manoeuvres. The former Luftstreitkräfte (Air Service) officers, now employed in the army, knew that the naval staff had been the main opponents of the creation of an independent air arm. The navy resented the Luftstreitkräfte in turn for its control of production and development of aircraft during the war. The German naval staff also resented the army's unwillingness to support naval logistics and the development of naval aviation requirements. Commander-in-chief of the Reichsmarine Admiral Hans Zenker was also wary of the Reichstag's attitude toward the navy and the very need for a fleet of any kind was in question. Zenker was certain that if cooperation with the army was too close, the navy maybe placed under army command.[2]

The Reichsmarine supported a small naval air program. Designing firms Heinkel and Dornier Flugzeugwerke were contracted to produce seaplanes and naval aircraft. Ernst Heinkel's Heinkel He 1 and Claude Dornier's Dornier Wal were among the most effective seaplanes of the 1920s. One advantage for the navy was the allowance of a large anti-aircraft force. The navy could use aircraft for towing and exercises which enabled it to conduct a more open program of aircraft development in contrast to the army. Zenker felt it unnecessary to join the army in clandestine development programs in Russia. In the early 1920s the navy spent one-sixth of what the army spent on aviation.[2]

The Treaty of Versailles banned most aspects of aerial development in Germany. For all of its diligence the treaty did not prohibit naval exercises with aircraft. The loophole allowed for the development of aircraft in the naval sphere of influence. The Paris Treaty of 1926 restated the terms of the treaty in Versailles but relented over the issue of air defence. Germany would be permitted to develop air defence systems to guard against aerial aggression. Although this did not translate into a green light to develop naval aircraft by 1927 the Germans were initiating secret training and design programs at Warnemuende under the guise of Radio Experimental Command. An Coastal Air Section was created but masqueraded as a private enterprise. It was dissolved on 1 September 1929 in favour of using private firms. The Reichsmarine hired aircraft for fleet exercises from Luftdienst G.m.b.H which charged the navy 453 RM per hour for a contracted allowance of 3,000 flying hours per year. By 31 January 1931 naval cadets were joining the navy and the first regulations on cooperation between naval and air units had been published. The beginnings of a naval air arm had been created.[3]

Göring and Raeder

Adolf Hitler (left) with Hermann Göring, 16 March 1938.

When Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist party came to power in 1933 the ground work laid by the Reichsmarine and the Weimar Republic government was reversed. Hitler appointed his close associate Hermann Göring, a Nazi supporter, ally of Hitler and World War I flying ace with 22 victories and the holder of the Orden Pour le Mérite, as National Kommissar for aviation with former Deutsche Luft Hansa director Erhard Milch as his deputy. In April 1933 the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM – Reich Air Ministry) was established under Göring's direction. Göring was adamant all aviation belonged to the newly established Luftwaffe, created in March 1933. It was to exist as an independent air force.[4]

Göring's logic in having an independent air force was militarily prudent but the future Reichsmarschall saw the new Luftwaffe as a power base and personal fiefdom as well as a crucial war weapon and consequently he was unwilling to share it with the navy.[5] His views brought him into conflict with Großadmiral Erich Raeder, commander-in-chief of the navy. Göring loathed the navy and its Commander-in-Chief Raeder.[4] In Göring's eyes, both Raeder and the navy represented the bourgeois clique of German society the National Socialist revolution had pledged to eliminate.[6] During World War II their rivalry devolved into open hostility.[7]

Raeder did not oppose the independence of German air power but believed in a naval air arm under naval control. If the newly christened Kriegsmarine, a replacement for the Reichsmarine, was to be effective it required aerial striking power. The arguments over the control of naval aviation ended temporarily in 1937 when the German Defence Ministry (German: Reichswehrministerium) stated naval aviation would be the domain of the Luftwaffe but specialised units would be placed under the operational control of the Kriegsmarine.[8]

On 4 February 1937 Göring invited Raeder to a private conference which the later accepted. At the meeting, held on 11 March, Raeder handed Göring a detailed memorandum asking for naval aviation to be seconded, permanently, to the navy as it was in the best position to understand naval requirements. The results of the conference and conflict were summed up by the Defence Ministry. The supreme commander Werner von Blomberg ordered that aviation units in support of naval operations was the domain of the Luftwaffe but under Kriegsmarine control. It did not resolve the question of which service should be responsible for aerial operations at sea. After the naval staff complained again at the absence of a resolution on 10 March a new conference was organised with Albert Kesselring, Chief of the General Staff, and Göring on 1 April and 10 May with the same result. Göring attacked Blomberg's and Raeder's views and thus decided that air units should only be put at the disposal of the navy during specific operations. Perhaps exasperated and defeated, Raeder noted on 20 May 1937, "Commander in Chief, Navy has decided that the demand of command by the Navy over all Naval Air units shall not be voiced."[9] Raeder noted that Göring did not accept that the navy should have control of air units, and likely never would.[8]

End of naval air arm

The Kriegsmarine—Luftwaffe conflict continued along the same lines as before over the course of 1937 and 1938. Göring did not openly reject the claims of the navy, nor did he deny the importance of air power in sea warfare, which gave him plenty of latitude in discussions. Göring continued to show willingness to cooperate, but only in matters that the Luftwaffe could profit from the suggestions and research of the Kriegsmarine. He ordered the dismemberment of naval–air activities and organisations at his own discretion and according to his own plans. The position of the navy became weaker. Göring had been named Hitler's deputy for the Four Year Plan and he was now in a position to govern all policy concerning the allocation of aerial resources. Under those circumstances it appears Raeder and the navy accepted that a naval air arm was not going to become a reality. The final confirmation of how the air and sea arms were to interact was decided at a conference on 27 February 1939 and ratified by a memorandum drawn up by Karl Bodenschatz (adjutant to Göring) signed by Göring and Raeder. The former would retain all control over naval air units and operational control would be exercised by a Luftwaffe officer assigned to the Kriegsmarine.[10]

The regression of naval aviation continued regardless of its potential. During the Spanish Civil War German aircraft—mainly Heinkel He 59 and Heinkel He 60s—sank 144 ships out of the 554 lost by the Republican forces and played a big role in General Franco's victory. Shortly before the fall of Barcelona in 1939, for example, aircraft sank 30 ships and damaged scores more in the harbour.[11] The success of anti-shipping operations did not spur naval aviation to a place of importance under the new Luftwaffe staff. Resembling the faulty policies of Admiral Zemker, air doctrine produced under Walter Wever's tenure as Chief of the General Staff (1933–1936) relegated naval concerns to fourth place on the list of priorities in his draft of the Conduct of the Air War in 1935. Nevertheless, much of the progress in naval aviation was initiated by the Luftwaffe, rather than the Kriegsmarine. Other members of the air arm tried to give naval aviation the attention in needed. General Hellmuth Felmy, commanding Luftlotte 2, set up a specialised naval aircraft corps in his command under the control of Hans Geisler—a naval aviator and former sailor. Felmy was responsible for conducting air operations against England in May 1939. The experienced airmen suggested Wever appoint another naval airman, Joachim Coeler, as inspector of naval aviation. These men developed air-dropped torpedoes and naval mines which proved very successful from 1940. However, all attempts to produce a naval air arm were thwarted by Hitler's deputy and commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring.[12]

Early War

On 1 September 1939 German forces invaded Poland beginning World War II in Europe. The navy was immediately engaged in operations against the British Royal Navy in the North Sea. The inadequacy of naval air operations was brought to Hitler's attention to Raeder on 23 October 1939 in which he urged for closer cooperation and joint operations by both services. On 30 October 1939 Naval Group West under the command of Admiral Alfred Saalwächter submitted a memorandum to the Naval Staff entitled Air Units under the Commander, Naval Air West. Saalwächter noted the forces at his disposal were too weak to support operations over vast distances and current operations exhausted the tiny forces at his disposal rendering them unfit for operations for extended periods. The situation, he noted, made it impossible to reconnoiter enemy activities or attack his forces in clear weather conditions. Saalwächter complained that the Dornier Do 18 and Heinkel He 115 aircraft available were too few in number and losses outstripped production. He required 378 aircraft with 126 battle-ready. Current strengths stood at 85 machines. There was no authority to which the Naval Staff could submit this request. Raeder lobbied Hitler for more resources but he deferred to Göring.[13] Göring proposed that of the 12 Staffeln of naval aircraft three be sent to the X. Fliegerkorps (10th Flying Corps) which he tasked with all anti-shipping operations. The remaining nine Rader could retain. Raeder sent a rejection letter to Göring on 31 October 1939 arguing for naval units to be expanded to 24 Staffeln up to 1942 but to no avail.[14]

Raeder attended a meeting with Hitler on 21 December 1939. He informed Hitler that naval reconnaissance operations were impossible. In response Göring allowed X. Fliegerkorps to be seconded to the navy and for the transfer of Dornier Do 17 bombers. Admiral Otto Schniewind compiled a memo on 15 January 1940 entitled Organisation and Expansion of the Naval Air Units of Commander in Chief, Navy. Schniewind noted only 14 Staffeln (Squadrons) were at the disposal of the navy. Schniewind argued that X. Fliegerkorps be given responsibility for air-sea operations to assist naval–controlled unit. He also asked for an allocation of the new Dornier Do 217 bomber for naval use. Göring was trying to limit naval squadrons to nine multi purpose and six reconnaissance units but did not resist the suggestion X. Fliegerkorps should be engaged in anti-shipping operations, but he refused the navy's use of the Do 217 and insisted the He 115 would have to remain sufficient on the grounds the type would go to the newly established X. Fliegerkorps. On 4 April 1940 Göring implemented another program to reduce the naval air forces from 12 to nine Junkers Ju 88s in a Staffel and 11 Do 17s per Dornier-staffel and nine in each Blohm & Voss BV 138-equipped Staffel.[15] The proposal was put to the Naval Staff on the eve of Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Denmark and Norway. In the event, the campaign proved what even small air strength could accomplish against shipping and enemy naval forces.[16]

On 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht invaded and conquered The Netherlands, Belgium and France within 46 days, securing the French capitulation on 25 June 1940. The conquest of Western Europe was not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. The occupation of France positioned the Germans for an air and naval assault on the United Kingdom. The strategic advantage gained by the possession of French air and naval bases on the Atlantic coast put German U-Boats and aircraft some 700 miles closer to the critical Allied shipping lanes and within range of British ports in the south, east, west and north. This enabled the German submarines to reach much deeper into the Atlantic, all the way to the western seaboard of the United States and Canada—the later being a major source of resources and protection in the shape of the Royal Canadian Navy; the third largest navy in the world by 1945.[17][18] This advantage enabled the U-Boats to avoid the very dangerous passage to the Atlantic through the North Sea, or worse, the heavily mined English Channel. Critically, it allowed for deep Atlantic air operations by the Luftwaffe.[19][20]

Operations over Britain

Dönitz, as Flag Officer of the U-Boat fleet, was keen to invest in naval aviation.

Even in 1940, the Luftwaffe did not have the command structure and resources in a number of essential areas. It lacked specialised maritime aircraft designs, a staff interest in naval aviation, and possessed a commander-in-chief who was unwilling to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine. This ensured that those responsible for the direction of German strategy at that time did not immediately recognise the potential damage the Luftwaffe could do to British sea communications. The Luftwaffe command was busy replacing its losses from the Western campaign in which it had lost 28 per cent of its aircraft.[21][22] Although it could still command over 1,000 medium bombers in July 1940 it did not possess many long-range aircraft or effective air-dropped torpedoes, nor was it experienced in operations against naval vessels. The short comings of the Luftwaffe in this regard were not readily apparent. The threat from German aircraft against unarmoured and slow merchant ships, and even warships on occasion, became apparent in the Norwegian Campaign.[23]

The OKL did not view sea communications as the principal target of the air arm. Göring and his chief of staff, Hans Jeschonnek, thought an aerial assault on mainland Britain would destroy its armament factories, the Royal Air Force (RAF), and British morale. The air offensive of the Battle of Britain, they hoped, would be enough to convince the British to sue for peace. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) hoped peace negotiations would avoid a hazardous amphibious landing in Britain, codenamed Operation Sea Lion, from being carried out. Hitler was receptive to this idea, and his Führer Directive No. 17 made sure German efforts went into planning and executing Operation Eagle Attack, which intensified the prolonged struggle for air superiority over southern England after 13 August. In this operation, targeting British shipping came a distant second to destroying the RAF and military industries on land.[24] The strategy demonstrated the extent to which the OKL hoped to win the war purely by the use of air power against land targets.[25] The preceding German air operations against seaports and shipping in July and August 1940—a phase in the battle known as the Kanalkampf—were merely a prelude to the battle for air superiority which was a necessary precondition for Operation Seelöwe, the proposed invasion of the United Kingdom. Anti-shipping operations fell by 239 sorties in August to 90 in September 1940.[26]

For the Kriegsmarine this was the least desirable strategy. Raeder and Karl Donitz, commander of the U-Boat force, believed the diversion of the Luftwaffe to these tasks was a wasted opportunity and interfered with the demands of the naval staff for support and reconnaissance in the Battle of the Atlantic.[27] In July and early August 1940 they had convinced the OKL to strike at shipping and ports by mine-laying across the entrances to ports and known shipping routes.[28] Aerial mining had proven highly effective. The lack of resources made available to produce these weapons denied these operations the chance to have decisive results,[29] but the naval staff hoped by striking at the most important centres of British sea communications—the ports of London, Liverpool and Bristol Channel—in addition to mining, would have war-winning results.[22]

By October 1940, daylight air battles over Britain were dying down in favour of night operations. Raeder and Dönitz pressured Hitler to devote more energy to bombing ports and German air strategy shifted to bombing British port cities (The Blitz). In the interim period, air attacks on convoys did start once more in November 1940. Dropping mines was the main tactic. Up until that time it had been practice to drop a few mines over a large area, in order to force the British to use large resources to sweep huge portions of ocean. However, to guarantee the entrances to ports were mined effectively to ensure success, as many mines as possible were dropped at once in confined areas. This was successful in the Thames Estuary where the Germans claimed nine steamers sunk and the river blockaded for 14 days.[30] Not until 6 February 1941, when Hitler signed Führer Directive No. 23 Directions for operations against the British War Economy, was aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority.[31][32] By the end of the air offensive over Britain in May 1941, as the Germans prepared for the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the Luftwaffe had, on occasion, done serious damage to these targets. In operations against Liverpool around 75% of the port's capacity was reduced at one point, and it lost 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping to air attacks, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged.[33] However, bad weather and the omnipresent Göring consistently resisted attempts by naval forces to gain influence in air power matters throughout the war.[34]

Formation of Fliegerführer Atlantik

On 6 January 1941, while Göring was on holiday, Raeder approached Hitler asking for more support to assist the growing successes of the U-Boats. Despite Göring's resistance, and under pressure from the navy, Hitler gave Raeder one Gruppe (Group) from Kampfgeschader 40 (I./KG 40). The furious Göring returned and immediately engaged in political manipulation to have it returned to Luftwaffe control. He proposed that it be returned in exchange for an Atlantic command.[35] Regardless of Raeder's objections, on 28 February 1941,[35] Hitler agreed to Goring's compromise and authorised the formation of a Luftwaffe naval command, under the control of Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) and its commander Hugo Sperrle. Named Fliegerführer Atlantik, it was based at Lorient. Martin Harlinghausen was elected to command the organisation. He had been a naval officer in the 1920s but had moved to the Luftwaffe and acted as chief of staff for X. Fliegerkorps in Norway, and was a leading authority in anti-shipping attacks with bombs. He was a logical choice to lead Atlantic air operations.[1][36]

Order of battle

Harlinghausen was responsible for organising fleet support, meteorological missions and even coastal protection, although he had barely 100 aircraft operational including Arado Ar 196 float aircraft. His commitment to the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, while managing the staff of X Fliegerkorps, he was unable to take the post until 31 March 1941. He agreed with the operational methods of Donitz, who favoured using the four-engine Focke-Wulf Fw 200 "Condors" to shadow convoys and direct U-Boats to their quarry; then a coordinated air-sea attack could defeat the convoy.[37]

Harlinghausen was given meager forced to achieve these ends. kg 40, based at Cognac and Bordeaux was handed over to him, containing all three groups of the unit (I., II., and III./KG 40). Küstenfliegergruppe 106, 406, 506, 606 and 906 were also made available, based at Amsterdam, (Netherlands), Brest, Westerland, Lannion, (France), Aalborg, (Denmark). Aufklärungsgruppe 122, a reconnaissance unit, was based in several locations; at Amsterdam, Brest and Wilhelmshaven. Stab./KG 40 was known to have just one Fw 200 on strength on 31 March 1941.[38] Owing to Hitler’s order on 6 January 1941, I./KG 40 was initially under the command of Donitz, who at that time was based at Lorient. It had only eight Fw 200s on strength at the end of 1940, and subsequent strength is unknown.[38] II./KG 40 was formed with 1 Staffel on 1 January. The 5th and 6th Staffel worked up on Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 217 E-1s into late June 1941. On 26 July it was declared operational, and transferred to Cognac with 29 Do 217s (12 operational) and one He 111.[39] III./KG 40 was known to have been formed on or about 24 March 1941, and was based at Brest. Strength details are unknown in 1941, but the unit did operate He 111s and the Fw 200.[40] It is estimated by April, 1941, Fliegerführer Atlantik had on strength 21 Fw 200s, 26 He 111s, 24 Heinkel He 115s, and a mixed force of Messerschmitt Bf 110s and Junkers Ju 88s, numbering 12 aircraft. The total number of aircraft by July 1941 had reached 155; 29 Fw 200s, 31 He 111s, 45 Ju 88s, 18 He 115s, 20 Dornier Do 217s, 12 Bf 110s and Ju 88 specialised reconnaissance aircraft.[41]

Equipment and tactics

The Fw 200 was the main weapon in the early rounds of the Atlantic air war. Its combat prowess rested on three vital capabilities: its ability to find targets, to hit targets and then to evade enemy defences. In 1940 the Fw 200s had only rudimentary capability of finding convoys and other suitable merchant targets. On a typical mission, an Fw 200 would fly about 1,500 km from Bordeaux to look for targets, west of Ireland, which would give the aircraft about three hours to conduct its search. Normally, Condors flew quite low (about 500 – 600 metres off the water), which made it easier to spot ships outlined against the horizon and avoided giving Allied shipping much warning. From this low altitude the Condor could search an area approximately the 320 by 120 km (200 by 75 nautical miles), which several crewman searching for ships with binoculars. In decent weather, which was rare in the Atlantic, the observers might spot a convoy 15–20 km (10–12 miles) away, but cloud cover could reduce this by half. In 1941, improved Fw 200s meant longer range, and a four-hour station (up from three) could be maintained, which increased the search area by 25 per cent. In December 1942, the low-UHF band FuG 200 Hohentwiel ASV radar extended the search area to four times that of 1940. The radar could detect a ship 80 km (50 mi) away and its beam was 41 km (25 mi).[42]

There were perennial problems for KG 40, and the other ‘Condor units’. Lack of numbers and serviceability meant there was no guarantee that one or two sorties of three to eight hours would be active when a convoy passed through air space in range of the Luftwaffe. Thus the ability of Fliegerführer Atlantik to find convoys remained sporadic until late in the command’s service.[43]

Further limitations were a result of the aircraft itself. A lack of proper bombsight equipment and poor forward visibility meant the aircraft had to attack from low level. This meant an approach at just 45 metres at 290 kph (180 mph) and then release of bombs at 240 metres (790 ft) from the target. This was known as the “Swedish turnip” tactic by crews. This allowed for a high chance of a direct hit or damaging near miss. The Fw 200 carried four SC 250 kg bombs, ensuring a hit potential. Merchant vessels lacked armour or fire-control systems at that time, so a hit or more would have a high chance of sinking a ship. This meant an average of one ship sunk for every attack made. At low level, it was not uncommon for German crews to achieve three out of four hits. However, many bombs failed to explode at low level, owing to improper fusing of the ordnance. Once the Lotfernrohr 7D bombsight was introduced — with a similar degree of accuracy to the top secret American Norden bombsight — more accurate bombing from 3,000 metres (9,840 feet) could take place with an error range of just 91 metres (300 feet). Later Fw 200s were fitted with heavier machine guns and cannon, so that strikes at low level could also damage the superstructure of ships.[42]

Improvements were relatively quick, but the type was a civilian design, converted to military use. Initially Fw 200Bs were built to fly in thin air at high altitude, with no sharp manoeuvring. Kurt Tank – its designer – had made the aircraft’s long range possible by using a light airframe that was two to four tons lighter than its contemporaries. This meant the aircraft did not have fuel tank sealant or armour protection. An under-strength structure contributed to these vulnerabilities, which made the Fw 200 unable to sustain much punishment. The engines were also underpowered, meaning it struggled to stay airborne if one was knocked out. The six unarmoured fuel tanks inside the cabin made it exceptionally prone to bursting into flames. When a Condor attempted to manoeuvre to avoid anti-aircraft fire or enemy fighters, its weak structure could be damaged, causing metal fatigue and cracks, resulting in the loss of the aircraft.[44] In the C variant, major improvements were made to its defensive armament, causing fighters to avoid lengthy duels. However, they operated at low level mostly, to avoid attacks from below. This limited their operational range and options. They could ‘jink’ to throw an enemy aircraft off its aim, but they could not outrun or outturn an opponent. Poor evasion qualities meant the type was not the ideal operational weapon.[45]

High tide: 1940–41

The Luftwaffe effort now extended into the North and central Atlantic but cooperation between aircraft and submarines occurred more by accident than by design. Dönitz had foreseen the need for very long-range reconnaissance aircraft exercises with submarines in May 1938. He selected the Dornier Do 26 seaplane for service with Transozeanstaffel (Trans-Ocean Squadron) in October 1939. Unfortunately most of the aircraft were used in the invasion of Norway and the survivors were not a sufficient force. They served from Brest until March 1941 when they returned to Germany. Donitz then placed his faith in the Heinkel He 177 program but the type suffered development problems and he had to settle for the Fw 200 as an interim solution. I./KG 40 under the command of Major Edgar Petersen was the first unit to reach Brest in July. Peterson, however, was employed in mine-laying operations with caused 16.6 percent losses. Peterson angrily protested to the then Chief of Staff Hans Jeschonnek who returned the unit to the reconnaissance role. The unit proved to be of little use. Crews were too few and restricted to two or three sorties every two weeks. Reports also had to pass through several commands—Fliegerkorps IV (to which I./KG 40 was attached) and then the naval command in France Marine Gruppe West—before being dispatched to submarine flotillas.[46]

Anti-shipping aces Bernhard Jope and Fritz Fliegel of KG 40, Bordeaux, 1941.

The period, August 1940 to May 1941, was known by the Kriegsmarine as the First Happy Time, because of the considerable amount of Allied ships sunk for light losses. Even before the formation of Fliegerführer Atlantik, the success of air attack on convoys during this time was almost immediate. Under the command of Donitz, in August 1940–February 1941, Fw 200s sank 52 ships for only four losses.[47] At this time several anti-shipping aces emerged including Oberleutnant Bernhard Jope who crippled the RMS Empress of Britain. The sinking ship received a coup de grâce by U-32, commanded by Hans Jenisch. Hans Buchholz would also become another successful merchant ship "killer."[48] By Christmas 1940, KG 40 had sunk 19 ships of 100,000 tons and damaged 37 of 180,000 tons. In January, 17 ships were sunk (65,000 tons) and five damaged.[49] February was worse for the British, losing 21 ships to Fw 200s, totalling 84,301 tons.[50]

In January 1941 HX 90, OB 274, HG 50 and SL 61 were successfully attacked. The later raid, on 19 January, sank seven ships from HG 50 and SL 61.[49] On 8 February, U-37 discovered convoy HG.53. The U-Boat reported its presence to Fliegerführer Atlantik. I./KG 40 was dispatched and sank five ships (9,201 grt), although 29,000 grt was claimed. The role was reversed a few days later when Convoy OB.288 was discovered by Fw 200s, and U-Boats sank a number of ships. However, inadequate navigation training, exacerbated by out-of-date meteorological data, created errors in location of reports of up to 450 kilometres (280 mi), while 19 per cent of all reports gave errors in course of up to 90 degrees.[37]

The creation of Fliegerführer Atlantik gave Dönitz cause for optimism. It was not always easy, communicating and coordinating with air and sea forces. U-Boats were unable to make accurate navigation using sun or star sightings and even when convoys were located they had trouble homing in bombers because their short-range transmitters were too weak to reach the aircraft. However, they were strong enough to alter British defences. Harlinghausen was irritated when his aircraft communicated accurate locations and the U-Boats failed to respond. Only when he complained to the BdU did he learn from Donitz that the navy failed to inform the Luftwaffe that there were no U-Boats in the area to respond. There were errors in reports pertaining to location and course of convoys. By the end of March, 1941, attempts at close cooperation were abandoned in favour of more flexible approached. Dönitz noted in his war diary that enemy signals about German air attacks would allow his intelligence (B-Dienst) to locate the convoy. He supposed that this would offer a better chance of interception.[37]

During the first quarter of 1941, the Condors sank 171,000 grt, the vast majority being lone ships. In one case, a sustained attack upon Convoy OB.290 on 26 February 1941 accounted for seven to nine vessels (49,865 grt), all sunk by KG 40 Fw 200s. However, with never more than eight aircraft operational, this was an exception. Soon, British CAM ship (catapult aircraft merchantmen) appeared, and the time of light Condor losses ended.[37][50] Buchholtz himself was killed when he encountered the SS Umgeni.[51]

Donitz envisaged a cooperation of air and sea forces in mass attacks against convoys. The wolfpack tactics were proving successful, and he sought to supplement them with the Luftwaffe. The Condors were to break up the convoys, and scatter them so the Wolf packs could move in and dispatch the ships while they were unprotected. In March, the Luftwaffe won back control of KG 40 had placed under Harlinghausen’s control, and success dried up. kg 40 was forced to suspend operations for two weeks (probably due to insufficient support).[52]

The British recognised the threat posed by long-range German naval aircraft and set operations in motion to destroy the Condors at base. A Commando mission was considered but dismissed for operational difficulties and the likelihood of failure and heavy casualties. Instead, RAF Bomber Command was asked to destroy the bases on the Atlantic coast. These operations had been carried out before Fliegerführer Atlantik had been formed. An RAF raid on 22/23 November 1940 destroyed four hangars and two Fw 200s. Follow up raids were unsuccessful, and it was not until 13 April 1941 that three more Fw 200s were lost to air attack. The British failed to disrupt production at the Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen or to destroy more Condors in the field, due to poor bombing accuracy and improved German defences.[53]

Mixed results

On 30/31 March 1941, the command missed convoy convoy OB 302 as neither the U-Boats nor Luftwaffe could find it. In April KG 40 was only able to make 74 sorties. Attacks had been carried out on the 6 and 16 April and by the end of the month, seven ships had been sunk. More ominously, RAF Coastal Command was making better efforts to defend convoys against air attack. On 16 April, a Bristol Beaufighter from RAF Aldergrove shot down a Fw 200C-3 – the first Condor lost in action to an enemy fighter. On 18 April, another Condor was badly damaged by convoy fire from convoy HG.58, and crashed in Ireland. Further operations failed. OB 316, 318 and 122.html HX 122 escaped the commands shadowing efforts. SL 72 and OB 321 were found on 11 and 14 May, sinking one ship from each convoy, but failed to guide any U-Boats to their targets. In May, only three ships sunk and one damaged.[54] Around this time, the He 111 units were withdrawn owing to heavy losses in the Channel. They were replaced by Kampfgeschwader 26 and Kampfgeschwader 30, which had remained under Luftflotte 5 after the withdrawal of Fliegerkorps X to the Mediterranean. These units made up 20 He 111 and 24 Ju 88s, which operated directly against British shipping and ports.[41] III./KG 40 also converted to the Fw 200 instead of the He 111, to allow it to operate further away from Britain and avoid air attack.[55]

The British response to the Condors was simple but effective. Merchant ships were still lightly armed with anti-aircraft weapons.[55] So when a formation of German aircraft attacked, instead of staying formed in front of the convoy to protect against U-Boats, they withdrew to the rear and formed a tight defensive circle. They then used all the available firepower they could must to deter attacks. It worked when KG 40 attempted to attack HG 65 using the “Swedish turnip” method. The ships drove off the attack. The Germans lost two Fw 200s, one crashed in Portugal, the other in Spain. The Spanish allowed German technical teams to recover the aircraft and crew. OG 66 was also missed. By the end of June, only four ships (6,000 grt) had been sunk for four losses.[56]

The Hawker Sea Hurricane W9182 on the catapult of a CAM ship.

During the Bismarck's sortie Operation Rheinübung in May 1941, Fliegerführer Atlantik was tasked with providing cover for its return to port. Kampfgruppe 100, Kampfgeschwader 1, Kampfgeschwader 54 and Kampfgeschwader 77 were made available for this purpose. They failed and Bismarck was sunk. Fliegerführer Atlantik'ss commanding officer, Martin Harlinghausen, came in for much criticism for failing to help the ship. The sinking of Bismarck ended German surface vessel activity in the Atlantic for the remainder of the war.[57]

The relations between the Kriegsmarine had hardly been improved with the failure of Rheinübung. Since 1937 Göring and the Luftwaffe had thwarted any attempt by the navy to produce a naval air arm. Not only did the Luftwaffe maintain control over all aspects of aviation, the naval commanders, like Raeder and Dönitz had to rely, on Göring's good will to receive support. In order to have air support, the highest authorities in both services had to consult on the use of units. Even if the negotiations were devoid of friction, it was inflexible and inefficient system.[58]

In June 1941, the enemy's gorwing anti-submarine strength forced Donitz to operate 20°W, beyond the range of the Condors, which now interdicted the sea lanes between Gibraltar and Britain. The command's aircraft were ordered to Bordeaux for this purpose by July. Donitz' decision irritated Harlinghausen, who planned a major offensive in the summer and the relations between the two men cooled, only to warm again when the aircraft reverted to reconnaissance roles supporting U-Boats—ironically because shipping defences had proven so successful Fw 200s could only attack when they had cloud cover. Gibraltar traffic was easier to monitor. The Fw 200s flew Fächer (Fan) search patterns from 45°N and 34°S and 19°W (sometimes 25°W) and found targets that way.[59]

In July to December 1941, the success of Fliegerführer Atlantik was mixed. After a failed attack on HG.65, Harlinghausen ordered the abandonment of the “Swedish turnip” tactic since they were too vulnerable to improving British defensive armament. In July, the official orders of Fliegerführer Atlantik amounted authorisation for reconnaissance only. No attacks were to be made against convoys only individual ships could be attacked. They found four convoys for U-Boats in July, but made no attacks themselves. However, on 18 July, Hauptmann Fritz Fliegel, a Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross holder, attempted to attack convoy OB 346. He targeted the 7,046-ton freighter Pilar de Larrinaga. However the gunners shot his starboard wing off and he crashed into the sea, killing all on board. Another Fw 200C-3 was shot down 400 km (250 mi) west of Ireland by a Lockheed Hudson of No. 233 Squadron RAF. The crew were rescued. In total, four Fw 200s were lost.[60]

British countermeasures

On 2 August the catapult British' concept was validated. From the CAM ship SS Maplin, Lieutenant Bob Everett took off in a Hawker Hurricane and succeeded in downing a Condor shadowing SL 81. kg 40 had some revenge when a Condor sank a freighter, and a U-Boat attack sank five more ships from the 20-strong convoy on 5 August.[60]

British defences forced the Fw 200s to revert to reconnaissance. However, a major battle developed over several separate convoys; HG.73 and HG.74 in September. HG.73 was composed of 25 merchantmen and 11 escorts including HMS Springbank, a catapult ship. A Fairey Fulmar launched, and got within range of the Fw 200s, but its guns jammed. Without air cover was, the convoy was subjected to attack by sea and air. The Condors guided the submarines in and the U-Boats sank 10 ships, including Springbank. Simultaneously, the battle for HG 74 began. This convoy had 26 ships and ten escorts including the first escort carrier to be built—HMS Audacity. A Fw 200 sank a ship picking up survivors from a U-Boat attack (Walmer Castle). The attack altered two fighters, which dispatched the Condor. The Condors kept their distance. However, they soon picked up OG 75, another convoy. Despite poor weather and improved defences, the Condors shadowed HG.75 eight days. But the strong escort limited the attacks to one loss. HG 74 made it to Liverpool from Gibraltar without loss.[61] OG.69 and OG.71 were also savaged by a combined air and submarine attack.[62]

File:Fw200 1.jpg
An Fw 200 Condor sinking. The machine was shot down and its crew members are exiting the aircraft via lifeboats, spring 1941.

On 6 November, the units of Fliegerführer Atlantik engaged OG 76 in a month-long battle, which lasted until 16 December. The convoy had left Liverpool bund for Gibraltar on 28 October. Sighted by KG 40 on 6 November, six Fw 200s were to shadow and direct U-Boats to it. HMS Audacity was present, and launched her fighters against the Condors, downing one Fw 200. Five U-Boats were guided in, but were repulsed by the escorts and the convoy which made it to Gibraltar unscathed. On 14 December it returned to Liverpool. By 16 December, KG 40 had picked it up. The U-Boats were repulsed again, and the Fw 200s were forced to retreat under fighter attack on 18 December. On 19 December, two Condors were lost to Audacity’s fighters. With the Condors out of the battle, the U-Boats tried on their own, sinking one destroyer and two merchant ships. On 21 December, Audacity was spotted outside the convoy and was sunk in ten minutes. Five of her six fighter pilots from No. 802 Squadron FAA were saved. With the carrier gone, the Condors returned. They noted the presence of an RAF B-24 Liberator, but no engagement is known.[63]

In October, Martin Harlinghausen himself was wounded. Although unusual for a commander, he took part in operations to experience combat conditions for himself. In an attack on shipping in the Bristol Channel, he was wounded. His deputy Ulrich Kessler temporarily took command. Kessler had not held high rank before now, an indicator of how unimportant the OKL viewed Luftwaffe operations over the Atlantic.[64]

The last six months of 1941 had been a severe blow to Fliegerführer Atlantik. It had sunk just four ships (10,298 tons) and damaged two for the loss of 16 Condors, including seven to convoy defences. The carrier ship had validated the concept of the escort carrier, which the Admiralty pursued with interest. The air war over the Atlantic and battle for Britain’s sea communications had turned against the Germans in this period.[61]

On 11 December 1941 Hitler declared war on the United States. While this gave German submarines plenty of targets, the order to send more vessels to American waters made less U-Boats available for cooperation with Fliegerführer Atlantik. Between 1 August 1940 and 31 December 1941, Fw 200s made 41 contacts with convoys, 18 were exploited by U-Boats that sank 48 merchant ships (129,771 grt), along with two destroyers, a corvette and Audacity.[65]

On 5 January 1942, Harlinghausen was replaced by Ulrich Kessler. His time commanding Fliegerführer Atlantik was not a happy one. He was denied the resources he needed. He was unable to support the U-Boats on the west side of the Atlantic, nor interdict convoy routes while anti-shipping operations turned to the Mediterranean and Arctic Convoys. Italian-designed aerial torpedoes (F5a) had proven successful in the Regia Aeronautica. However, these weapons were given to KG 26 and other units operating against shipping in the Mediterranean Sea and against the Arctic convoys off Norway.[65]

Struggle for resources: 1942–43

Radar might have helped detect the convoys regardless of the starvation in resources. However, progress was slow. A 136 MHz FuG Atlas was installed in a Fw 200C-3/U3 in July 1941 and the similar Neptune-S was later trialled off Norway, but proved disappointing. When it was compared to a captured British metric (200 MHz) ASV (air-to-surface vessel) MK II from a crashed Hudson in Tunisia, the British radar was found to be far better. By this time Rostock, operating 120 MHz with a 16-nautical-mile (30 km) range was under development, but production was slow and by November 1942 only five Fw 2000C-4/U3s in the west had radar, and one of those was the captured British set. The low-UHF band FuG 200 Hohentweil, operating at 550 MHz, with a range of 43 nm (80 km) was being developed. It entered service in August 1943 in the Fw 200C-6, but Kessler's low place in the pecking order meant only 16 Fw 200s out of 26 in III./KG 40 had radar. It is unknown whether other groups were issued with the radar.[66]

"Second Happy Time"

Battles over the Biscay

The radar-equipped Fw 200 C-4. Summer, 1943.

Defeat and dissolution: 1944

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Commanding officers

References

Citations
  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 National Archives 2000, p. 105.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Corum 1997, pp. 78–80.
  3. ↑ Ashby 2005, pp. 24–25.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Ashby 2005, pp. 28–32.
  5. ↑ Korda 2009, p. 10.
  6. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 42.
  7. ↑ Lee 1972, p. 76.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Ashby 2005, pp. 26–34.
  9. ↑ Ashby 2005, p. 34.
  10. ↑ Ashby 2005, pp. 35–36.
  11. ↑ Corum 1997, pp. 212–123.
  12. ↑ Corum 1997, pp. 264–266.
  13. ↑ Ashby 2005, pp. 37–40.
  14. ↑ Ashby 2005, pp. 41–42.
  15. ↑ Ashby 2005, pp. 40–43.
  16. ↑ Hooton 1994, pp. 236–237.
  17. ↑ Ireland 2003, pp. 44, 67.
  18. ↑ Graves, Jenson and Johnson 2003 p. 216.
  19. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 125.
  20. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 25.
  21. ↑ Hooton 2007, p. 90.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Isby 2005, p. 230.
  23. ↑ Hooton 1994, pp. 236-237.
  24. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 235.
  25. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 109.
  26. ↑ Hooton 1997, pp. 42–44.
  27. ↑ Isby 2005, pp. 112-113.
  28. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 233.
  29. ↑ Isby 2005, pp. 127-128.
  30. ↑ Isby 2005, pp. 235-236.
  31. ↑ Hooton 2010, p. 88.
  32. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 45.
  33. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 37.
  34. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 23.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Hooton 2010, p. 111.
  36. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 29.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 37.2 37.3 Hooton 2010, p. 112.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 de Zeng et al (Vol 1) 2007, p. 129.
  39. ↑ de Zeng et al (Vol 1) 2007, p. 132.
  40. ↑ de Zeng et al (Vol 1) 2007, p. 134.
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 National Archives 2000, p. 106.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Forczyk 2010, p. 30.
  43. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 30, 32.
  44. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 32.
  45. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 33.
  46. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 46.
  47. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 239.
  48. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 47.
  49. ↑ 49.0 49.1 Forzcyk 2010, p. 48.
  50. ↑ 50.0 50.1 Forzcyk 2010, p. 49.
  51. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 48.
  52. ↑ Forzcyk 2010, p. 50.
  53. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 28.
  54. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 51.
  55. ↑ 55.0 55.1 National Archives 2000, p. 107.
  56. ↑ Forczyk 2010, p. 52.
  57. ↑ Jackson 2002, pp. 50-52.
  58. ↑ Isby 2005, p. 244.
  59. ↑ Hooton 2010, p. 113.
  60. ↑ 60.0 60.1 Forczyk 2010, p. 53.
  61. ↑ 61.0 61.1 Forczyk 2010, p. 59.
  62. ↑ Hooton 1997, p. 49.
  63. ↑ Forczyk 2010, pp. 56-59.
  64. ↑ National Archives 2000, p. 109.
  65. ↑ 65.0 65.1 Hooton 2010, p. 114.
  66. ↑ Hooton 2010, p. 115.
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External links

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