BM25 Musudan

Musudan
Type	Ballistic missile, Mobile IRBM
Service history
In service	In development, likely failed test on April 14, 2016
Used by	North Korea, possibly Iran
Production history
Manufacturer	North Korea
Specifications
Length	12m
Diameter	1.5m
Warhead	Conventional, possibly nuclear
Warhead weight	1,000–1,250 kg (est.)
Engine	Liquid (same or derived from R-27 R-29)
Propellant	storable liquid (also upper solid) , NTO N2O4 with UDMH (or Hydrazines , AK IRFNA , TG02 Samin Tonka with half the range)
Operational range	2,500–4,000 km (est.)
Guidance system	Inertial
Launch platform	MAZ-based vehicle

Korean name
Chosŏn'gŭl	무수단
Hancha	舞水端
Revised Romanization	Musudan
McCune–Reischauer	Musudan

The Musudan (Chosŏn'gŭl: 무수단; hancha: 舞水端) missile 무수단 미사일 , officially Rodong-B 노동B , Hwasong-10 화성10호, also known by the names BM-25, Taepodong X, Nodong / Rodong-B and Mirim, is a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. The Musudan was first revealed to the international community in a military parade on 10 October 2010 celebrating the Korean Worker's Party's 65th anniversary, although experts believe these were mock-ups of the missile. The Musudan resembles the shape of the Soviet Union's R-27 Zyb submarine-launched missile, but is slightly longer. On Kim Il Sung's 104th Anniversary, North Korea celebrated by testing a missile and failed. South Korea believes it was the Musudan. The validity is currently unknown.

Development

In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea invited the Makeyev Design Bureau's ballistic missile designers and engineers to develop this missile, based on the R-27 Zyb.

It was decided that, as the Korean People's Army's MAZ-547A/MAZ-7916 Transporter erector launcher could carry 20 tonnes, and the R-27 Zyb was only 14.2 tonnes, the R-27 Zyb's fuel/oxidizer tank could be extended by approximately 2 metres. Additionally, the warhead was reduced from a three-warhead MIRV to a single warhead.

The actual rocket design is a liquid fuel rocket, generally believed to use a hypergolic combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel, and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as oxidizer. Once the fuel/oxidizer combination are fed into the missile, it could maintain a 'ready to launch' condition for several days, or even weeks, like the R-27 SLBM, in moderate ambient temperatures. A fueled Musudan would not have the structural strength to be safely land transported, so would have to be fueled at the launch site.

It was originally believed that Musudan's rocket motors made up the second stage of the Taepodong-2, which North Korea unsuccessfully test fired in 2006. However analysis of the Unha-3 launch, believed to be based on the Taepodong-2, showed that the second stage did not use the same fuel as the R-27, and is probably based on Nodong rocket technology. There is a possibility that the Musudan likewise is using the Nodong's kerosene and corrosion inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) propellants, reducing the missile's range by about half.

History

On April 6, 2013, reports suggested two Musudan rockets were carried to a base near the eastern coast of North Korea and prepared for a likely launch. This could have been intended to be the first ever test of the rocket or a military drill. On May 7, 2013, it was reported that these two Musudan rockets were moved away from their coastal launch site.

On April 14, 2016, it was reported that one or two Musudan rockets were being prepared for launch in the port city of Wonsan. On the 104th anniversary of the birthday of Kim Il Sung, North Korea launched what was believed to be a BM25 Musudan from its east coast at 5:30 a.m. local time, but South Korea said it deviated from a "normal" trajectory and the launch is presumed to have failed; U.S. Strategic Command systems also “detected and tracked” the missile, also assessing that the launch failed. Then on 28 April, two missile launches were conducted that South Korea believes were the second and third tests of the Musudan, both of which failed; one was fired in the morning off the northeastern coast and crashed a few seconds after liftoff, and another in the evening was launched but also presumably failed. This brings the total number of Musudan test launches, and failures, to three in a single month. A fourth launch attempt from the same site also failed as the missile exploded, upon ascend from the launch pad at dawn of May 31, 2016.

Description and technical specifications

Estimated maximum range of some North Korean missiles

Musudan

• Launch weight: about 20 tons (est.)
• Diameter: 1.5 m
• Total Length: 12 m
• Payload: 1,000–1,250 kg (est.)
• Warhead: single
• Maximum range: 2,500–4,000 km (est.)
• CEP: 1.3 km
• Launch platform: North Korean-produced TEL, resembling a stretched and modified MAZ-543

Operators

Map with BM25 operators in blue

Current operators

• North Korea: According to one source, more than 200; other source claims 12 deployed. 16 were seen at once during the October 10, 2010 Military Parade, although experts contacted by the Washington Post believed these were mock-ups of the missile.
• Iran: 19, according to a leaked, classified U.S. State Department cable, although Iran has never displayed the missiles causing some U.S. intelligence officials to doubt the missiles were transferred to Iran.

Section 25 of this leaked cable (written before the 10 October 2010 appearance of the missile) says:

Russia said that during its presentations in Moscow and its comments thus far during the current talks, the U.S. has discussed the BM-25 as an existing system. Russia questioned the basis for this assumption and asked for any facts the U.S. had to provide its existence such as launches, photos, etc. For Russia, the BM-25 is a mysterious missile. North Korea has not conducted any tests of this missile, but the U.S. has said that North Korea transferred 19 of these missiles to Iran. It is hard for Russia to follow the logic trail on this. Since Russia has not seen any evidence of this missile being developed or tested, it is hard for Russia to imagine that Iran would buy an untested system. Russia does not understand how a deal would be made for an untested missile. References to the missile's existence are more in the domain of political literature than technical fact. In short, for Russia, there is a question about the existence of this system.

See also

• R-27 Zyb
• KN-11
• JL-1

External links

• R-27, astronautix.com
• R-27, Globalsecurity.org