Operation Ironside

Operation Ironside
Part of Operation Bodyguard
Ironside was one of several plans within the overall Bodyguard deception
Operational scope	Political deception
Location	Bay of Biscay
Planned	December–March 1944
Planned by	London Controlling Section
Target	Bordeaux
Date	May–July 1944
Executed by	Agents Tate, Bronx and Garbo

Operation Ironside was a Second World War military deception undertaken by the Allies in 1944. The operation threatened an invasion of France, along the Bay of Biscay, in support of the invasion of Normandy and supposed invasion of southern France (Operation Vendetta). Ironside formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a broad strategic deception plan instigated by the Allies throughout 1944. Bordeaux was an important military port during the war and had already been a target of commando raids two years earlier. Ironside intended to play on German fears of an invasion in the region, with the aim of tying down defensive forces following Operation Overlord in June 1944.

Planned by the London Controlling Section, Ironside was communicated via double agents between May and June 1944. Unlike other Bodyguard deceptions, the plan was put across entirely by double agents without support from physical deception. Agent Bronx took the lead with support from Tate, Rudloff and Garbo. Ironside's story included an initial two-division assault, using Overlord formations, staged out of the UK. This would then be followed up with six divisions sailing from the East Coast of the United States. There is no indication that Ironside was successful in convincing the Germans of imminent Allied plans to invade the Bay of Biscay. Worried about exposing agents as false, the Twenty Committee sent disinformation via less important agents and with words of caution. In addition, Allied landings around Bordeaux may have seemed implausible because it was beyond air cover from the United Kingdom and lacked the normal physical elements associated with an invasion.

After the operation closed, at the end of June 1944, the threat of invasion from the US was informally kept alive. It was revisited as Ironside II in mid-July as support for Operation Ferdinand. The invasion story was replaced with a supposed Allied plan to increase French resistance in the Bordeaux region to tie up German forces. Most of Ironside II was ignored by the Germans whose interest had turned away from the Bordeaux region.

Background

Main article: Operation Bodyguard

Operation Ironside formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a broad strategic military deception intended to confuse the Axis high command as to Allied intentions during the lead-up to the Normandy landings. The overall aim of Bodyguard was to tie down German forces away from Normandy by threatening other targets. Ironside's specific objective was to tie up the 17th and 11th SS Panzer divisions deployed in the south of France.

Overall planning for Bodyguard, and Ironside, rested with John Bevan and the London Controlling Section (LCS). The LCS had been set up in 1942 following successes in deception in the Middle East by Dudley Clarke. After initial attempts at deception planning the department was tasked with bringing Bodyguard to fruition. One of their most useful deception channels was through double agents. During the early stages of the war the Abwehr (German intelligence) had sent spies to Britain, however all of these either surrendered or were captured. Some were used as an extensive double agent network under the control of the Twenty Committee.

Bordeaux was an important port for the German war effort receiving large amounts of cargo, mostly raw materials, from overseas. The Gironde estuary and Bordeaux had already been a target for the Allies. Operation Frankton was a 1942 commando raid targeting important shipping in the port. In January 1944 the Allies intercepted communications indicating that German commanders were concerned by the possibility of landings in the Bay of Biscay region of France. The next month, German naval and air units undertook anti-invasion exercises in the area. Ironside was intended to amplify these concerns.

The plot for Ironside was that, ten days following D-Day, Allied forces would land in the Bordeaux region. This force would spend around twelve days establishing a bridgehead before advancing to meet Operation Vendetta formations (another deception operation targeting the Mediterranean coast of France). The supposed target of Ironside was the Garonne Estuary with landing sites at Royan and Accord.

At first Bevan suggested that the fictional invasion force should stage from the American East Coast. Newman Smith, based out of New York and responsible for the US elements of the deception, felt this was an unrealistic story and suggested a large force from the US might conceivably reinforce a bridgehead established by units from the UK. Formations intended for Normandy could be "re-purposed" for the initial invasion. The final plan earmarked two Overlord divisions for the assault with the supposed reinforcements consisting of six real divisions (the 26th, 94th, 95th, and 104th Infantry, and the 10th and 11th Armored) under the notional command of Lieutenant General Lloyd Fredendall.

Operation

Send £50 quickly. I have need of a dentist.

Coded message sent by agent Bronx, 29 May 1944

Ironside began on 23 May 1944 with the aim of having the threat established by 29 May and continued until 28 June (22 days after the Normandy landings). It was implemented via double agents, in Britain and the United States, under the control of the Twenty Committee. The operation did not receive any resources from the Navy or Airforce and so the deception had no physical element. This meant that Ironside had none of the traditional accompaniments to an invasion, including reconnaissance flights, bombardment and naval operations. As a result the Twenty Committee was cautious about using the more important agents to pass over the deception. The lead was given to the less important, if still trusted, agent Bronx, an Argentine socialite called Elvira Chaudoir who communicated with her handlers via letter. From April 1944 she had also begun sending codes as telegrams, which were faster than letters in the event of an imminent invasion. Her code was based on a financial theme, assigning different amounts of money to possible invasion sites. Mentioning her doctor (almost certain) or dentist (certain) showed Chaudoir's certainty in the information. Asking for the money "straight away", "urgently" or "quickly" identified when the invasion would take place (within a week, a fortnight or month respectively).

Agent Tate (a Dane sent to England in 1941 and turned double shortly after) opened the operation, on 23 May, in a message to his handlers stating that a friend from the US had identified an expeditionary force, consisting of six divisions, preparing to sail. On 29 May, Bronx sent a telegram identifying an invasion targeted at the Bordeaux region within a month, using the code "dentist" to say she was certain of the information. She also sent a follow-up letter explaining that the information came from a drunken British officer in the Four Hundred Club who had later sworn her to secrecy. According to Bronx the officer had boasted about an airborne assault in the Bordeaux region that would be in the papers the following morning. The next day he had told her the operation had been delayed by a month. Agent Garbo (one of the most important double agents of Bodyguard) sent a report, on 5 June, from one of his fictional sub-agents explaining that a US division based in Liverpool were preparing to head to Bordeaux. Rudloff, an agent based in the United States, sent four reports between 2 and 20 June. He identified the six divisions under Fredendall being sidelined for specialist training, in bridge building but not amphibious assault, under heavy security. A last minute deception involved an MI6 transmitter in France. Known to be under German control, when the operator asked about routes to send escaped prisoners of war the handlers replied that they should, from 15 June, be sent toward Bordeaux.

Despite all of the agent messages, the Twenty Committee considered that Ironside was quite implausible and as a result was cautious about promoting it too heavily. Most of the messages were sent with words of caution or uncertainty to ensure that the agent would not be compromised. Garbo explicitly noted that he was unsure of his informant and skeptical of the report.

Impact

German intelligence documents indicate that there was never strong belief that the Allies were ready to land in the Bordeaux region. Prior to Ironside's execution Axis commanders had considered the idea and conducted exercises in preparation. Following the deception, intercepted situation reports suggested that the Germans believed rumours of landings in the area to be "cover operations of small caliber" and part of the cover for a main Allied thrust at Calais (in itself a deception called Operation Fortitude South). Although training continued in the region, and the 17th SS Panzer Division was delayed in mobilising to Normandy, it appears that the Germans did not consider imminent landings very likely. Part of the problem was that Bordeaux may not have appeared a plausible Allied target because it was out of range of fighter aircraft cover from the United Kingdom. Historian Terry Crowdy's analysis is that Ironside may have suffered simply from lack of resources. Like other, successful, deceptions it preyed on a concern held by Hitler and German High Command. Crowdy suggests that with physical deception, and more effort, Ironside could have succeeded in the same way as deceptions aimed against Calais, Normandy and the Mediterranean.

The German high command did however expect a series of secondary invasions, and Bordeaux was considered a potential target. According to historian Ben Macintyre, Ironside at least contributed to confusion as to Allied intentions following the Normandy landings. Allied planners agreed that Bronx's communication contributed to keeping the 11th Panzer (one of the two German divisions in the region) in South-West France to defend against attack.

Ironside II

The premise of Operation Ironside was reused, in July 1944, in support of Operation Ferdinand. Bevan had asked Newman Smith to retain the threat of a US invasion force after 28 June (when the initial deception was supposed to have ended). Agent Rudloff sent messages on 10, 12 and 18 July referring to the Ironside force.

In mid July, the Allies began deception activities to cover Operation Dragoon, the August invasion of southern France, and Ironside was considered as an option. However, Noel Wild and Ops (B), the SHAEF deception planners, were worried about the impact of a theoretical US invasion force on the continuing Fortitude deception. So it was decided that a new story would be presented to the Germans which would suggest that the Allies intended to bolster French resistance in the south of the country. The operation went largely unnoticed and German interest in the Bordeaux region dissipated.