Active Measures Working Group

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group was a group led by the United States Department of State and later by the United States Information Agency (USIA). The group was formed early during the Reagan administration, in 1981, when some mid-level officials in the U.S. Department of State sought a more robust effort to counter aggressive Soviet propaganda. Some believe also that the group was created because active measures experts in the CIA wanted an outlet for their findings that could be more overt and credible than those of the CIA.

Representatives of the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and the United States Information Agency were among the government agencies that served in the group. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Dennis Kux, was the group's first chairman.

The group's activities did not address the full range of Soviet active measures. Instead, its focus was countering Soviet disinformation. The Active Measures Working Group developed an approach that expanded the U.S. Government's monitoring of Soviet disinformation from an activity conducted exclusively by the CIA into an interagency counter-disinformation effort.

Background

In the early days of the Cold War, the CIA tracked Soviet disinformation and forgeries, but only periodically attempted to expose them. During the 1970s the U.S. chose not to fight back against Soviet active measures for two reasons. The first is that policy makers did not want to let what they saw as “unnecessary confrontation” to sidetrack progress on more important issues such as strategic arms control. The second reason was the disgrace of the CIA. During the Vietnam War, Johnson had ordered the CIA to monitor certain American citizens, notably the Black power and antiwar movements, which he feared were supported and infiltrated by foreign communists. Eventually this and similar monitoring programs were revealed to the public, prompting major public contention and major reforms of the CIA. The CIA was particularly damaged by the Senate (Church Committee) and House (Pike Committee) Intelligence Committees, and then did little to respond to anti-American disinformation.

In October 1979 Stanislav Levchenko, head of the Active Measures Line of the KGB Rezidentura in Tokyo, contacted American officials and was granted political asylum in the United States. Levchenko explained the workings of the Soviet apparatus and how it was carried out, under his direction, in Japan. Levchenko’s information, combined with that of Ladislav Bittman, who had been the deputy head of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service’s Disinformation Department, was instrumental in helping the CIA understand many of the operations that were being carried out against the United States. This information was also reported to policy makers and Congress.

Under the Reagan Administration, the United States began openly challenging Soviet disinformation and active measures.

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group was encouraged by the interest of William Casey, Director of the CIA, high level State Department support like such from Lawrence Eagleburger, and the input of John Lenczowski of the National Security Council.

Interagency cooperation

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group combined the information gathered at USIA international posts, CIA reporting, and FBI investigations. When this information arrived, it was analyzed by both working group analysts and CIA disinformation experts. The group made use of the CIA's computerized database of forgeries, and, through the CIA, had unfettered access to KGB defectors involved in active measures.

The group instructed USIA overseas offices to report all disinformation that they encountered. The group also used the USIA and State Department to distribute its publications both domestically and abroad to journalists, government employees, U.S. embassy staff abroad, and foreign government representatives and staff.

The Active Measures Working Group was used as an outlet for expert knowledge within the government bureaucracy. For example, the group published a report by David Hertzberg, a young INR analyst. Hertzberg noticed a trend of increased illegal activity that was at odds with the image that the Soviet Union was trying to project: the Soviets were expanding their espionage activities, particularly attempts to steal military technology and defense industry proprietary information, and this corresponded with an increase in the number of Soviet agents expelled from countries for espionage. Hertzberg's report was published in February 1982 as an “informal research study for background information" and was eventually converted into a Foreign Affairs Note entitled, "Expulsion of Soviet Representatives from Foreign Countries, 1970-81." The document generated news coverage and commentary on the expansion of Soviet spying and was directly cited by at least two major publications.

Methodology

Report-Analyze-Publicize

The Active Measures Working Group developed a methodology named Report-Analyze-Publicize (or RAP).

The group's first counter-disinformation effort against the Soviet Union took the form of a report, "State Department Special Report 88, Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations" in October 1981. The document was a four-page overview of soviet active measures techniques and included Soviet disinformation themes and past examples. 14,000 copies of the report were distributed to news organizations, federal agencies, etc.

The group also issued a series of State Department Foreign Affairs Notes that USIA distributed to journalists, academics, and other interested persons abroad. One important publication distributed by the group was the House Intelligence Committee hearing on Soviet Active Measures which showed foreign audiences that there was congressional support for exposing Soviet disinformation.

The group also held press conferences to expose Soviet forgeries and distributed copies of the fake documents to attending journalists.

This method was further encouraged when Congress passed a law in 1985 requiring that the Interagency Active Measures Working Group publish a series of reports on Soviet active measures. Accordingly, the State Department published three reports in 1986, 1987 and 1989. The FBI also contributed by providing reports that were printed in these publications on Soviet active measures in the United States.

"Truth Squads"

Members of the Active Measures Working Group gave presentations describing Soviet disinformation activities, pointing out the falsehoods or common themes and tell-tale signs of forgery. These presentations were often held internationally, including countries like Morocco, Italy, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya. The group averaged presentations in two countries per week and also visited NATO headquarters annually for meetings on Soviet active measures.

These visits were also geared toward gathering information from foreign governments about Soviet active measures campaigns conducted in their respective countries.

Dennis Kux commented on the success of these presentations: “the fact that we made a credible presentation, not an ideological show lent a certain amount of professionalism to the whole effort.”

Important cases

1984 Summer Olympics

In an attempt to seek revenge for Carter’s boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics in 1980, the KGB manufactured a public relations crisis by forging letters from the Ku Klux Klan that threatened athletes from African countries and mailed them from Washington, DC, to these countries’ Olympic committees.

Grammatical errors in the letters suggested they were originally drafted in Russian, but could not provide a certain conclusion. Then, a source of the FBI in the KGB that had participated in the production of the letters confirmed their origin was the KGB. The Active Measures Working Group then reported conclusively that the letters were Soviet forgeries, which allowed USIA and the State Department to reassure the targeted African countries. As a result, no African country withdrew their athletes from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.

Gingrich Report

In 1985, Newt Gingrich, a congressional representative from the state of Georgia, sponsored an amendment promoting a permanent office in the Department of State on “Soviet and communist disinformation and press manipulation” to better inform the American public on these issues. Gingrich also added an amendment to unrelated legislation stipulating that the State Department must produce a public report on Soviet active measures. This responsibility fell to the Active Measures Working Group. The first of these reports was "A Report on the Substance and Process of the anti-US Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns," published in August 1986. The report was made public in early October, in time for President Reagan’s summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland.

Operation Infektion

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group's policy of exposing Soviet disinformation contributed to the end of the Soviet disinformation campaign, Operation Infektion, which accused the United States of deliberately creating the AIDS virus in a government laboratory and spreading it.

According to the State Department, "U.S. policy has been to respond vigorously to Soviet disinformation, on both diplomatic and public levels." Information efforts were coordinated abroad among the State Department's Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, the USIA, American Embassies, U.S. Information Service centers, and the Voice of America to unmask the disinformation campaign within foreign publics. The United States also made it clear to the Soviet Union that there would be no cooperation between them on the cure and treatment of AIDS while the Soviet Union continued to use this disseminate Operation Infektion. At a session of the U.S.-USSR Joint Health Committee, held in April 1987, U.S. government officials expressed their anger that the Soviets would "use a grave international public health program for base propaganda purposes."

In August 1987, the group published its second annual report on Soviet Influence Activities: "A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–1987." This report, as well as a Foreign Affairs Note published the month before, focused on the Soviet disinformation campaign on AIDS.

This disinformation campaign was discontinued by the Soviets after these efforts made Soviet disinformation too costly to use.

Gorbachev's gripe

In October 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev waved a copy of one of the group's reports at U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, complaining that publishing such information undermined relations between their countries. The report that Gorbachev held up was entitled, "Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–1987," and, among other things, outlined the factual and scientific falsehoods of Operation INFEKTION. Gorbachev insisted that the report contained "shocking revelations" and that it amounted to "nourishing hatred" for the Soviet Union.

Other cases of Soviet disinformation during the 1980s

• The Soviets forged a memorandum from the President of the United States to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the director of the CIA, that ordered the establishment of a U.S. military force called the “Permanent Peace Forces” that would be used to intervene in Latin America. This forgery inflamed nationalist and anti-American sentiment in Latin America.
• The Soviets circulated false allegations that the United States was importing Latin American children only to use their body parts for organ transplants.
• In 1982, the Soviets forged a transcript of a speech made by United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick that called for the balkanization of India and planted it in the Indian press.
• The Soviets forged an NSC Policy Paper which outlines global U.S. political and military foreign policy between 1985 and 1988. A central theme in the paper was the purported U.S. goal of "strategic dominion" over the Soviet Union. The forgery included underlying goals such as the integration of Swiss, Austrian, and Swedish national resources into NATO and the "neutralization" of discussions concerning nuclear-free zones.
• The Soviets forged a letter from the USIA to Senator Durenberger in 1986 which outlines a purported USIA plan to disseminate rumors about events in the Soviet Union in the wake of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant such as exaggerated reports of the number of victims.
• Religious organizations that were used as front organizations: the Anti-Zionist Committee, the Christian Peace Conference, the World Council of Churches, the Asian Buddhist Council for Peace.
• The World Peace Council was the largest Soviet front organization set up after WWII.

Working Group products and publications

The following are products and publications which the Interagency Active Measures Working Group either produced or participated in. The group published numerous reports on topics such as Soviet front organizations, the expulsion of Soviet officers from the United States and foreign countries, Soviet disinformation broadcasting, and Soviet anti-American forgeries.

1981

• Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations. Special Report 88. October 1981.

1982

• Expulsion of Soviet Representatives from Foreign Countries, 1970–81. Foreign Affairs Note. February 1982.
• World Peace Council: Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs Note. April 1982.
• Religion in the U.S.S.R.: Laws, Policy, and Propaganda. Foreign Affairs Note. May 1982.
• Soviet Active Measures: An Update. Special Report 101. July 1982.
• Moscow’s Radio Peace and Progress. Foreign Affairs Note. August 1982.
• Communist Clandestine Broadcasting. Foreign Affairs Note. December 1982.

1983

• Lawrence Eagleburger. “Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures.” NATO Review 31, no. 1 (April 1983), 6–11.
• Expulsions of Soviet Officials Worldwide, 1982. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1983.
• Soviet Active Measures: Focus on Forgeries. Foreign Affairs Note. April 1983.
• The World Peace Council’s “Peace Assemblies.” Foreign Affairs Note. May 1983.
• Lawrence Eagleburger. “Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures.” Department of State Bulletin #2077, August 1983, 45–49. Reprinted from NATO Review 31, no. 1 (1983).
• World Federation of Trade Unions: Soviet Foreign Policy Tool. Foreign Affairs Note. August 1983.
• Soviet Active Measures. Special Report 110. September 1983.

1984

• Expulsions of Soviets Worldwide, 1983. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1984.
• “Soviet Active Measures.” An Address by William E. Knepper, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Intelligence and Research, before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Current Policy, no. 595 (May 30, 1984).
• Soviet Fronts: Women and Youth. Foreign Affairs Note. July 1984.

1985

• Expulsions of Soviets Worldwide, 1984. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1985.
• Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council. Foreign Affairs Note. April 1985.
• Soviet Active Measures: Christian Peace Conference. Foreign Affairs Note. May 1985.
• Soviet Active Measures: The 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow. Foreign Affairs Note. June 1985.
• Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation: A Conference Report. June 1985.
• “Soviet Use of Active Measures.” An address by William J. Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Dallas Council on World Affairs. Current Policy, no. 761 (September 18, 1985).
• Update: The 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow. Foreign Affairs Note. December 1985.

1986

• Expulsions of Soviets Worldwide, 1985. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1986.
• Congressional Report: Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns. Congressional Report. August 1986.
• Recent Anti-American Forgeries. Foreign Affairs Note. November 1986.

1987

• Expulsion of Soviet Officials, 1986. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1987.
• Moscow and the Peace Movement: The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. Foreign Affairs Note. May 1987.
• “Disinformation, The Media, and Foreign Policy.” Conference Report. May 1987.
• Recent Anti-American Forgeries: An Update. Foreign Affairs Note. July 1987.
• The U.S.S.R.’s AIDS Disinformation Campaign. Foreign Affairs Note. July 1987.
• Congressional Report: Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–1987. Congressional Report. August 1987.

1988

• Expulsions of Soviet Officials, 1987. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1988.
• Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost. United States Information Agency Report. March 1988.

1989

• Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987–1988. Department of State Report. August 1989.

Abolition

Support for the group began to deteriorate in the late 1980s because Soviet disinformation seemed less of a threat in light of Gorbachev's Glasnost, and the Soviets' promise to cease all disinformation operations. The group’s mission to counter Soviet disinformation lost its pertinence upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and along with it bureaucratic interest in the group’s efforts.

The quality of the group’s membership declined as both the CIA’s and FBI’s longest serving group members distanced themselves and began sending younger, less experienced participants in their place. Furthermore, many of the Reagan appointees who supported the working group had left the NSC in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal.

The center of the counter disinformation effort shifted to USIA’s Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation headed by Charles Wick and included Herbert Romerstein and Todd Leventhal.

The Active Measures Working Group’s final report, “Soviet Active Measures in the ‘Post-Cold War’ Era 1988–1991,” came out in June 1992 and was written by Todd Leventhal under the auspices of USIA. By the time of publication, the Soviet Union no longer existed, the report warned that even though the Soviet Union had collapsed, active measures were still a threat to U.S. interests because a number of anti-American groups and countries were adopting and expanding the use of active measures: “As long as states and groups interested in manipulating world opinion, limiting U.S. Government actions, or generating opposition to U.S. policies and interests continue to use these techniques, there will be a need for the United States Information Agency to systematically monitor, analyze, and counter them.”

Lessons learned

1. "In responding to disinformation, the United States has the tremendous advantage that the truth is inherently more powerful than lies. But if the lies go unchallenged, then they can have a damaging effect." —Charles Wick, 1988
2. Simply exposing acts of disinformation was an extremely powerful tool in undermining their efficacy.
3. Effective strategic communication necessitates interagency collaboration because of its ability to pull together diverse expertise from multiple organizations.

See also

• Active measures
• Information warfare
• Propaganda
• Propaganda techniques
• Psychological Operations (United States)
• Psychological warfare
• Unconventional warfare
• War of ideas
• Disinformation
• Black propaganda
• Counter Misinformation Team
• Operation INFEKTION
• United States Information Agency

Further reading

• U.S. Information Agency, “Soviet Active Measures in the ‘Post-Cold War’ Era 1988–1991,” (June 1992).

Available at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/index.htm#Contents

• Thomas Boghart, "Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign."

Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/pdf/U-%20Boghardt-AIDS-Made%20in%20the%20USA-17Dec.pdf

• "Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–1987"

Available at: http://jmw.typepad.com/files/state-department---a-report-on-active-measures-and-propaganda.pdf

• Dennis Kux, "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation:Overview and Assessment," (1985)

Available at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1985/1985%20kux.pdf

• William J. Daugherty, "Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency," (2004) (ISBN 0-8131-9161-0).
• Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, New York: Encounter Books (2010) (ISBN 978-1-59403-223-3).
• Ladislav Bittman, "The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View," (1985).
• Ladislav Bittman, "The Deception Game," (1981) (ISBN 9780345298089).
• Norman A. Bailey, "The Strategic Plan that Won the Cold War: National Security Decision Directive 75," (1998).

Available at: http://www.hacer.org/pdf/Bailey001.pdf

• Benjamin B. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare," CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm#HEADING1-02

• Nicholas J. Cull, "The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989," (2009) (ISBN 0521142830).