Battle of the Philippine Sea

The Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–20, 1944) was a decisive naval battle of World War II which eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions. It took place during the United States' amphibious invasion of the Mariana Islands during the Pacific War. The battle was the last of five major "carrier-versus-carrier" engagements between American and Japanese naval forces, and involved elements of the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet as well as ships and land-based aircraft from the Imperial Japanese Navy's Mobile Fleet and nearby island garrisons.

The aerial theatre of the battle was nicknamed the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot by American aviators for the severely disproportional loss ratio inflicted upon Japanese aircraft by American pilots and anti-aircraft gunners. During a debriefing after the first two air battles a pilot from USS Lexington remarked "Why, hell, it was just like an old-time turkey shoot down home!" The outcome is generally attributed to American improvements in pilot and crew training and tactics, war technology (including the top-secret anti-aircraft proximity fuze), and ship and aircraft design. Although at the time the battle appeared to be a missed opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy had lost the bulk of its carrier air strength and would never recover. During the course of the battle, American submarines torpedoed and sank two of the largest Japanese fleet carriers taking part in the battle.

This was the largest carrier-to-carrier battle in history.

Background

With the death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto on April 18, 1943, Admiral Mineichi Koga had succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet the following day. Under his direction, the Imperial Japanese Navy sought to engage the American fleet in a single decisive battle in early 1944.

From the very start of the conflict in December 1941, the Japanese war plan had been to discourage America by inflicting such severe and painful losses on her military that the public would become war weary and the American government would be convinced to sue for peace and allow Japan to keep her conquests in east and southeast Asia. Though at a numerical disadvantage from the outset, and an industrial disadvantage that would add to that disparity over the course of time, the Japanese high command believed they could fight the U.S. Navy in a single, decisive engagement, known as the Kantai Kessen, which would allow them to defeat the Americans. However, their ability to fight and win such a battle was slipping away. Imperial Navy aircrew losses suffered over the course of the earlier carrier battles at Coral Sea and Midway, and the long Solomon Islands campaign of 1942-43, had greatly weakened the Japanese Navy's ability to project force with its carriers. As the Guadalcanal campaign was largely fought by the Imperial Navy, losses suffered there drastically reduced the number of skilled carrier pilots available to fill the carrier air groups. Losses suffered in the Solomons could be readily absorbed, replaced and made good by the U.S. Navy, but not by the Japanese. It took nearly a year for the Japanese to reconstitute their airgroups following the Solomons campaign.

The initial Japanese plan was to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet in early 1944, whenever it launched its next offensive, but the decisive battle consequently had to be delayed. Meanwhile, American material production capacity, aircrew training, and technological advances made a Japanese victory increasingly difficult to achieve. By the end of 1942, the Allied navies had overcome most of the technological edges Japan's ships and planes had held at the start of the war. Furthermore, by mid-1943 mass production of ships and improved aircraft began to tip the balance of forces in the favor of the Allies. Allied educational training practices similarly adapted to new developments, along the way totally revising fleet operations with parallel developments in both the Combat Information Center and in their doctrine, training, and practices to get the most out of the new communications and sensor technologies.

After puncturing Japan's 'outer' defensive ring at the costly Battle of Tarawa in late 1943, the U.S. Navy brought these improvements together in the form of the Fast Carrier Task Force, under Admiral Marc Mitscher (known as Task Force 58 when part of Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet and Task Force 38 when part of Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet). Led by this main strike force, in early 1944 the U.S. fleet continued its advance in a steady progression across the islands of the Central Pacific. After achieving their goals in the Gilbert Islands campaign, the Americans began a series of softening-up missions aimed at weakening Japanese land-based airpower to limit Japan's ability to interfere with future amphibious invasions. Few U.S. commanders realized how powerful Task Force 58 had become. Though initially undertaken with trepidation, the raids proved to be successful beyond anything U.S. planners had imagined - notably with Operation Hailstone that effectively neutralized the primary central Pacific warbase of the Imperial Japanese Navy - and changed the manner in which the war would be pursued.

While U.S. commanders, particularly Admiral Spruance, were wary of the Japanese trying to attack U.S. transports and newly landed forces, the Japanese were looking to engage and defeat the Fast Carrier Task Force. The Japanese commanders saw the Marianas island group in the central Pacific, including Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, as their inner circle of defense. Land-based fighter and bomber aircraft on these islands controlled the sea lanes to Japan and protected the home islands. As the Americans prepared for the Marianas campaign, the IJN concluded that the Kantai Kessen could be delayed no longer.

The Japanese had a number of advantages they hoped would turn the battle in their favor. Though outnumbered in ships and aircraft, they planned to supplement their carrier airpower with land-based aircraft. In addition, the Japanese aircraft had superior range, which could allow them to engage the American carriers beyond the range of American aircraft. Furthermore, with island bases in the area, the Japanese hoped to launch at distance, have their aircraft attack the U.S. fleet and then land on island airfields. They then could shuttle back and attack again on the return flight. Thus the U.S. fleet would be in the position of receiving punishment without being able to deliver it. Lastly, the area was dominated by the easterly trade winds. Naval aircraft of the era needed a head wind blowing across the flight deck to enable the aircraft to launch. The easterly trade winds that dominated the Central Pacific seas meant that aircraft carriers would necessarily have to be steaming eastward to launch and recover aircraft. This meant that a fleet located to the west of the Marianas would be in position to initiate and break off the battle, placing the initiative in the hands of the Japanese.

In March 1944, Admiral Koga was killed when his aircraft flew into a typhoon and crashed. A new Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, was appointed. He continued the current work, finalizing the Japanese plans known as "Plan A-Go", or "Operation A-Go" The plan was adopted in early June 1944, then within weeks quickly put into place to engage the American fleet now detected heading for Saipan.

Initial stages

On June 12, 1944, U.S. carriers started a series of air strikes on the Marianas, convincing Admiral Toyoda that the U.S. was preparing to invade. This move came as a surprise; the Japanese had expected the next U.S. target to be farther to the south, either the Carolines or the Palaus, and had protected the Marianas with only 50 land-based aircraft. From June 13–15, American carriers conducted airstrikes while surface forces engaged in shore bombardment operations against the Marianas in preparation for the coming battle. On June 15, 1944, the first American troops went ashore, which marked the start of the invasion of Saipan.

Since control of the Marianas would place the Japanese home islands in range of the new American B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers, the IJN decided that the time for the long-awaited Kantai Kessen (decisive battle) had arrived. Toyoda immediately ordered a fleet-based counterattack, which would commit nearly all of the Japanese navy's serviceable ships to the coming engagement.

The Japanese fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, consisted of three large fast fleet carriers (Taihō, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku), two slower carriers converted from ocean liners (Junyō and Hiyō), four light carriers (Ryūhō, Chitose, Chiyoda, and Zuihō), five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Kongō, Haruna and Nagato), 13 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, six oilers, and 24 submarines. The main portions of the fleet rendezvoused on June 16 in the western part of the Philippine Sea and completed refueling on June 17.

Ozawa commanded this force from his newly commissioned flagship, Taihō. In addition to extensive command facilities, reinforced torpedo blister, and large air group, Taihō was the first Japanese carrier to possess an armor-plated flight deck, designed to withstand multiple bomb hits with minimal damage.

At 1835 of 15 June a Japanese carrier and battleship force was sighted coming out of the San Bernardino Strait by submarine USS Flying Fish. An hour later USS Seahorse spotted a battleship and cruiser force steaming up from the south and located 200 miles east of the Philippine island of Mindanao. The submarine force was under orders to report sightings first, before attempting to attack. Thus Flying Fish waited till nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. Admiral Spruance, commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet was convinced that a major battle was at hand. After consulting with Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii, he ordered Task Force 58, which had separated and sent two of its carrier task groups north to intercept aircraft reinforcements from Japan, to reform and move west of Saipan into the Philippine Sea. Task Force 58 was commanded by Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher aboard his flagship, USS Lexington of Task Group 58.3. Spruance, who exercised overall command of the U.S. 5th Fleet, flew his flag aboard the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis, which was sailing in the outer defensive ring of Task Group 58.3.

A separate force under the command of Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, which consisted of eight older battleships along with the smaller escort carriers, was ordered to remain near Saipan to protect the invasion fleet and provide air support for the landings.

Task Force 58 was made up of five task groups. Deployed in front of the carriers to act as an anti-aircraft screen was the battle group of Vice Admiral Willis Lee; Task Group 58.7 (TG-58.7), contained seven fast battleships (Washington (flagship), North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Alabama), and eight heavy cruisers (Baltimore, Boston, Canberra, Indianapolis, Wichita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, and San Francisco). Just north of them was the weakest of the carrier groups, Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4 of one fleet carrier (Essex) and two light carriers (Langley, and Cowpens). To the east, in a line running north to south, were three groups, each containing two fleet carriers and two light carriers: Rear Admiral Joseph Clark's Task Group 58.1 (Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood and Bataan); Rear Admiral Alfred E. Montgomery's Task Group 58.2 (Bunker Hill, Wasp, Cabot, and Monterey); and Rear Admiral John W. Reeves's Task Group 58.3 (Enterprise, Lexington, San Jacinto, and Princeton). These capital ships were supported by 13 light cruisers, 58 destroyers, and 28 submarines.

Shortly before midnight on June 18, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz sent Spruance a message from Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii indicating that a Japanese vessel had broken radio silence. The message intercepted was an apparent dispatch from Ozawa to his land-based air forces on Guam. A "fix" obtained by radio direction-finding gave a solution for the origination of the message at approximately 355 miles (562 km) west-southwest of Task Force 58. Mitscher considered whether the radio fix was part of a Japanese deception, as the Japanese were known to send a single vessel off to break radio silence, to mislead their adversaries about the actual location of the main force.

File:USS Lexington (CV-16) Philippine Sea.jpg

F6F-3 landing aboard Lexington (CV-16) — Task Force 58 flagship

Mitscher realized that there was a chance of a night surface encounter with Ozawa's forces. Arleigh Burke, Mitscher's Chief of Staff (and a former destroyer squadron commander who had engaged and won a number of night time surface engagements against the Japanese in the Solomons), assumed that battleline commander Lee would welcome the opportunity, but discovered that Lee in no uncertain terms did not favor such an encounter. Having personally experienced the confusion that had been common place in the night actions of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Lee was not enthusiastic about a night engagement with Japanese surface forces, believing that his crews were not adequately trained for such an action. Shortly after learning of Lee's opinion, Mitscher requested permission from Spruance to move Task Force 58 west during the night to reach a launch position at dawn that would allow for a maximum aerial assault on the enemy force.

After considering for an hour, the reply back came refusing Mitscher's request. Mitscher's staff was disappointed with Spruance's decision. On the situation, Captain Burke later commented: "We knew we were going to have hell slugged out of us in the morning. We knew we couldn't reach them. We knew they could reach us." Spruance said "if we were doing something so important that we were attracting the enemy to us, we could afford to let him come - and take care of him when he arrived". This was in stark contrast to the Battle of Midway in 1942, where Spruance advocated immediately attacking even when his own strike force wasn't fully assembled, as neutralizing enemy carriers before they could launch their planes was the key to the survival of his carriers.

Spruance's decision was influenced by his orders from Nimitz, who had made it clear that the protection of the invasion fleet was the primary mission of Task Force 58. Spruance had concerns that the Japanese would attempt to draw his main fleet away from the Marianas with a diversionary force, while slipping an attack force in to destroy the landing fleet. Locating and destroying the Japanese fleet was not his primary objective, and he was unwilling to allow the main strike force of the Pacific Fleet to be drawn westward, away from the amphibious forces. Mitscher accepted the decision without comment. Spruance's decision in this matter, although subsequently criticized, was certainly justified; by this point in the war, it was well known that Japanese operational plans frequently relied on the use of decoys and diversionary forces. However, in this particular engagement (and in sharp contrast to the subsequent Battle of Leyte Gulf), there was no such aspect in the Japanese plan.

Before daybreak Spruance suggested if the daybreak searches revealed no targets the bombers could be sent to crater the airfields on Rota and Guam. With the fleet's contact-fuzed ordnance largely used up, Mitscher was left with the armour-piercing ordnance which he needed to combat the Japanese fleet. He informed Spruance he could not launch such strikes. As the morning broke, Task Force 58 launched search aircraft, combat air patrols (CAP), and anti-submarine patrols, and then turned the fleet west to gain maneuvering room from the islands. The U.S. Navy had developed a sophisticated command coordination and control, where CAP fighters were vectored by radar intercepts to meet the enemy bombers well before they could arrive at their targets. Any attackers that got through the CAP would then face a "gun line" of screening battleships and cruisers that would put up devastating barrages of VT fuzed anti-aircraft fire.

Battle

File:Battle Philippine sea map-en.svg

Map of Battle of the Philippine Sea

Early actions

The Japanese had already launched their morning search patrols using some of the 50 aircraft stationed on Guam, and at 05:50, one of these, a Mitsubishi Zero, found TF-58. After radioing his sighting of U.S. ships, the pilot attacked one of the destroyers on picket duty and was shot down.

Alerted, the Japanese began launching their aircraft on Guam for an attack. These were spotted on radar by U.S. ships. A group of thirty F6F Hellcats were dispatched from the Belleau Wood to deal with the threat. The Hellcats arrived while aircraft were still launching from Orote Field. Minutes later, additional radar contacts were seen, which were later discovered to be the additional forces being sent north from the other islands. A huge battle broke out; 35 of the Japanese aircraft were shot down, for the loss of a single Hellcat. It was a pattern that would be repeated throughout the day. At 09:57 large numbers of bogeys were picked up approaching the fleet. Mitscher said to Burke "Get those fighters back from Guam". The call "Hey, Rube!" was sent out. The fleet held steady until 10:23, when Mitscher ordered Task Force 58 to turn into the wind on course east-southeast, and ordered all fighter aircraft aloft, deployed in several layers of combat air patrol (CAP) to await the Japanese. He then put his bomber aircraft aloft to orbit open waters to the east to avoid the danger of a Japanese bomb strike into a hangar deck full of aircraft.

Japanese raids

Fighter aircraft contrails mark the sky over Task Force 58, June 19, 1944

The recall had been ordered after several ships in TF-58 picked up radar contacts 150 miles (240 km) to the west around 10:00. This was the first of the raids from the Japanese carrier forces, with 68 aircraft. TF-58 started launching every fighter it could, and by the time they were in the air, the Japanese had closed to 70 miles (110 km). However, the Japanese began circling to regroup their formations for the attack. This 10-minute delay proved critical, and the first group of Hellcats met the raid, still at 70 miles (110 km), at 10:36. They were quickly joined by additional groups. Within minutes, 25 Japanese aircraft had been shot down, against the loss of only one U.S. aircraft.

The Japanese aircraft that survived were met by other fighters, and 16 more were shot down. Of the 27 aircraft which now remained, some made attacks on the picket destroyers USS Yarnall and USS Stockham but caused no damage. Between three and six bombers broke through to Lee's battleship group and commenced their attacks, one of which scored a direct hit on the main deck of USS South Dakota, which killed or injured over 50 men, but failed to disable her; USS South Dakota was the only American ship damaged in this attack. Not one aircraft of Ozawa’s first wave got through to the American carriers.

USS Bunker Hill is nearly hit by a Japanese bomb during the air attacks of June 19, 1944.

At 11:07, radar detected another, larger attack. This second wave consisted of 107 aircraft. They were met while still 60 miles (97 km) out, and at least 70 of these aircraft were shot down before reaching the ships. Six attacked Rear Admiral Montgomery’s group, nearly hitting two of the carriers and causing casualties on each. Four of the six were shot down. A small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Enterprise, one torpedo exploding in the wake of the ship. Three other torpedo-aircraft attacked the light carrier Princeton but were shot down. In all, 97 of the 107 attacking aircraft were destroyed.

The third raid, consisting of 47 aircraft, came in from the north. It was intercepted by 40 fighters at 13:00, while 50 miles (80 km) out from the task force. Seven Japanese aircraft were shot down. A few broke through and made an ineffective attack on the Enterprise group. Many others did not press home their attacks. This raid therefore suffered less than the others, and 40 of its aircraft managed to return to their carriers.

The fourth Japanese raid was launched between 11:00 and 11:30, but pilots had been given an incorrect position for the U.S. fleet and could not locate it. They then broke into two loose groups and turned for Guam and Rota to refuel.

File:Vraciu June 19 1944 downed six.jpg

Lt. Alexander Vraciu downed six Japanese dive bombers in a single mission, June 19, 1944.

One group flying toward Rota stumbled upon Montgomery’s task group. Eighteen aircraft joined battle with American fighters and lost half their number. A smaller group of nine Japanese dive bombers of this force evaded U.S. aircraft and made attacks on USS Wasp and USS Bunker Hill, but failed to make any hits. Eight of these aircraft were shot down in the process. The larger group of Japanese aircraft had flown to Guam and were intercepted over Orote Field by 27 Hellcats while landing. Thirty of the 49 Japanese aircraft were shot down, and the rest were damaged beyond repair. Aboard the Lexington afterward, a pilot was heard to remark "Hell, this is like an old-time turkey shoot!"

Including the continued aerial slaughter over Orote Field, Japanese losses exceeded 350 planes on the first day of battle. American losses were relatively light, with about thirty planes being lost. Damage to American ships was minimal, and even the damaged South Dakota was able to remain in formation to continue her anti-aircraft duties.

Most of the Japanese pilots who successfully evaded the U.S. fighter screens were the small number of seasoned veterans who had survived the six-month Japanese advance early in the Pacific war, the Battle of Midway, and the Guadalcanal campaign.

Submarine attacks

Throughout the day, American scout aircraft had been unable to locate the Japanese fleet. However, two American submarines had already spotted Ozawa's carriers early that morning, and were about to provide a major assist to the Fast Carrier Task Force.

Japanese aircraft carrier Taihō

At 08:16 the submarine USS Albacore, which had sighted Ozawa’s own carrier group, had maneuvered into an ideal attack position; Lieutenant Commander James W. Blanchard selected the closest carrier as his target, which happened to be Taihō, the largest and newest carrier in the Japanese fleet and Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s flagship. As Albacore was about to fire, however, her fire-control computer failed, and the torpedoes had to be fired "by eye". Determined to go ahead with the attack, Blanchard ordered all six torpedoes to be fired in a single spread to increase the chances of a hit.

USS Albacore

Taihō had just launched 42 aircraft as a part of the second raid when Albacore fired its torpedo spread. Of the six torpedoes fired, four veered off-target; Sakio Komatsu, the pilot of one of the recently launched aircraft, sighted one of the two which were heading for Taihō and dove his aircraft into its path, causing the torpedo to detonate prematurely. However, the sixth torpedo struck the carrier on her starboard side, rupturing two aviation-fuel tanks. After coming under depth charge attacks from the carrier's escorting destroyers, Albacore was able to escape with only minor damage.

Initially, the damage to Taihō seemed minor; the flooding was quickly contained and the carrier's propulsion and navigation were unaffected. Taihō quickly resumed regular operations; however, gasoline vapors from the ruptured fuel tanks began to fill the hangar decks, creating an increasingly dangerous situation on board.

Another submarine, USS Cavalla, was able to maneuver to an attack position on the 25,675-ton carrier Shōkaku by about noon. The submarine fired a spread of six torpedoes, three of which struck the Shōkaku on her starboard side. Badly damaged, the carrier came to a halt. One torpedo had hit the forward aviation fuel tanks near the main hangar, and aircraft that had just landed and were being refueled exploded into flames. Ammunition and exploding bombs added to the conflagration, as did burning fuel spewing from shattered fuel pipes. With her bows subsiding into the sea and fires out of control, the captain gave orders to abandon ship. Within minutes, total catastrophe struck the vessel. Volatile gas fumes had accumulated throughout the vessel, and when an aerial bomb exploded on the hangar deck, a series of terrific explosions simply blew the ship apart about 140 miles (230 km) north of the island of Yap. The carrier rolled over and slid beneath the waves taking 887 navy officers and men plus 376 men of the 601st Naval Air Group, a total of 1,263 men in all, to the seabed. There were 570 survivors, including the carrier's commanding officer, Captain Hiroshi Matsubara. Futile attempts were made by destroyer Urakaze to destroy the submarine, but Cavalla escaped with relatively minor damage despite near misses from depth charges.

Meanwhile, Taihō was falling victim to poor damage control. Hoping to clear the explosive fumes, an inexperienced damage-control officer ordered her ventilation system to operate at full blast. This action instead spread the vapors throughout Taihō, putting the entire vessel at risk. At approximately 14:30, an electric generator on the hangar deck ignited accumulated fumes, triggering a series of catastrophic explosions. After the first explosions, it was clear that Taihō was doomed, and Ozawa and his staff transferred to the nearby Zuikaku. Soon thereafter, Taihō suffered a second series of explosions and sank. From a crew of 2,150, 1,650 officers and men were lost.

U.S. Counterattack

Japanese Carrier Division Three under attack by United States Navy aircraft from Task Force 58, late afternoon, June 20, 1944. The heavy cruiser circling at right, nearest to the camera, is either Maya or Chōkai. Beyond that, is the small aircraft carrier Chiyoda.

TF-58 sailed west during the night to attack the Japanese at dawn. Search patrols were put up at first light.

Admiral Ozawa had transferred to the destroyer Wakatsuki after Taihō had been hit, but the radio gear on board was incapable of sending the number of messages needed, so he transferred again, to the carrier Zuikaku, at 13:00. It was then he learned of the disastrous results of the previous day and that he had about 150 aircraft left. Nevertheless, he decided to continue the attacks, thinking there were still hundreds of aircraft on Guam and Rota, and started planning new raids for June 21.

The main problem for Task Force 58 was locating the enemy, who had been operating at a great distance. Early morning American searches on June 20 found nothing. An extra mid-day search flown by Hellcat fighter pilots also came back empty. Finally at 15:12 a garbled message from one of the Enterprise search planes indicated a sighting. At 15:40 the sighting was verified, along with distance, course and speed. The Japanese fleet was 275 miles out, moving due west at a speed of 20 knots. The Japanese were at the limit of the strike range of Task Force 58, and daylight was slipping away. Mitscher decided to launch an all out strike. After the first attack group had launched, a third message arrived, indicating the Japanese fleet were 60 miles farther out than previously indicated. The first launch would be at their limits of fuel, and would have to attempt landing at night. Mitscher canceled the second launch of aircraft, but chose not to recall the first launch. Of the 240 planes that were launched for the strike, 14 aborted for various reasons and returned to their ships; the 226 planes which continued on consisted of 95 Hellcat fighters (some carrying 500 pound bombs), 54 Avenger torpedo bombers (only a few carrying torpedoes, the rest four 500-pound bombs) and 76 dive bombers (51 Helldivers and 26 Dauntlesses). The Task Force 58 aviators arrived over the Japanese fleet just before sunset.

The fighter air cover Ozawa was able to put up would have been good by 1942 standards, but in 1944 the 35 or so fighters he had available to intercept the incoming U.S. attack were overwhelmed by the incoming 230 aircraft of Mitscher's attack. Though these few were often skillfully handled and the Japanese antiaircraft fire was intense, the U.S. planes were able to press in on the attack.

The first ships sighted by the U.S. strike were oilers, thirty miles before the carrier groups. The strike group from the Wasp, more concerned with their low fuel levels than with finding the more important Japanese carriers and battleships, dove on the tankers. Two of these were damaged so severely that they were later scuttled, while a third was able to put out fires and get underway.

The carrier Hiyō was attacked and hit by bombs and aerial torpedoes from four Grumman Avengers from Belleau Wood. Hiyō was set afire after a tremendous blast from leaking aviation fuel. Dead in the water, she slipped stern first under the waves, taking the lives of 250 officers and men. The rest of her crew, about one thousand, survived to be rescued by Japanese destroyers.

The carriers Zuikaku, Junyō, and Chiyoda were damaged by bombs. Returning American strike pilots generally assessed these carriers as more crippled than they actually were, mistaking for devastating direct hits what Japanese post-war records revealed to have actually been huge geysers caused by near misses. The battleship Haruna was also hit by two bombs, including one directly on a main battery turret. Damage was contained and she was able to keep station, however, in some part thanks to her captain's decision to promptly flood the turret's magazine to avoid a chance of an explosion.

Twenty American aircraft in the strike were destroyed. These were lost both to Japanese fighters and to anti-aircraft fire that made up for a relative lack of accuracy with high volume of fire.

After the protracted strike, it became clear that most of the aircraft returning to their carriers were running dangerously low on fuel, and to worsen matters, night had fallen. At 20:45, the first U.S. aircraft began to return to TF 58. Knowing his aviators would have difficulty finding their carriers, Mitscher decided to fully illuminate his carriers, shining searchlights directly up into the night, despite the risk of attack from submarines and night-flying aircraft. Picket destroyers fired starshells to help the aircraft find the task groups.

Planes were given clearance to land on any available flight deck (and not just their home carrier, which was the usual practice), and many did. Despite this, 80 of the returning aircraft were lost, some crashing on flight decks, and the majority ditching into the sea. Some pilots intentionally went down in groups to facilitate rescue, and more ditched individually either in a controlled landing, with a few gallons of fuel left, or in a crash after their engines came sputtering to a stop. Most of the crews (approximately three quarters) were fished from the seas, either that night from crash locations within the task forces, or over the next few days for those further out, as search planes and destroyers criss-crossed the ocean looking for them.

Aftermath

Japanese

That night, Admiral Ozawa received orders from Toyoda to withdraw from the Philippine Sea. U.S. forces gave chase, but the battle was over.

The four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 130 returned to the carriers. Many of these survivors were subsequently lost when the carriers Taiho and Shōkaku were sunk by submarine attacks on the first day of the battle. After the second day of the battle, losses totaled three carriers, more than 433 carrier aircraft, and around 200 land-based aircraft.

These losses to the already outnumbered Japanese fleet air arm were irreplaceable. The Japanese had spent the better part of a year reconstituting their carrier air groups, and the Americans' Fast Carrier Task Force had destroyed 90% of it in two days. The Japanese only had enough pilots left to form the air group for one of their light carriers. As a consequence, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, which took place a few months later, their carriers were used solely as decoys.

The Japanese military, which had shielded the Japanese public from the extent of their losses, continued this policy. Though the occurrence of the simultaneous Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Saipan were made known to the public, the extent of the disasters was withheld.

American

Losses on the U.S. side on the first day were only 23 aircraft. The second day's airstrike against the Japanese fleet saw most of the aircraft losses for the U.S. Of the 215 aircraft launched on the strike, only 115 made it back. Twenty were lost to enemy action in the attack, while 80 more were lost when they expended their fuel returning to their carriers and had to ditch into the sea.

Spruance's conservative battle plan, while not destroying all of the Japanese aircraft carriers, severely weakened the Japanese naval aviation forces by killing most of the remaining trained pilots and destroying their last operational reserves of naval aircraft. Without the time or resources to build sufficient aircraft and train experienced pilots, the surviving Japanese carriers were useless as weapons, a fact the Japanese acknowledged by using them as sacrificial decoys at Leyte Gulf. With the effective crippling of her best striking arm, Japan was increasingly forced to rely on land-based kamikaze suicide aircraft in a last-ditch effort to make the war so costly that the U.S. would offer peace terms (other than unconditional surrender).

Spruance was heavily criticized after the battle by many officers, particularly the aviators, for his decision to fight the battle cautiously rather than exploiting his superior forces and intelligence data with a more aggressive posture. By failing to close on the enemy earlier and more forcefully, his critics argue, he squandered an opportunity to destroy the entire Japanese Mobile Fleet. "This is what comes of placing a non-aviator in command over carriers" was the common refrain. Admiral John Towers, a naval aviation pioneer and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, demanded that Spruance be relieved. The request was denied by Admiral Nimitz. Moreover, Spruance was supported in his decision by Admirals Kelly Turner and Chester Nimitz, along with the most senior naval commander, the acerbic and highly demanding Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations.

In retrospect, it certainly is instructive to compare Spruance's caution (in particular, his suspicion of a diversionary force) with Admiral Halsey's headlong pursuit of an actual diversionary force four months later at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. There, Halsey's decision left the American invasion fleet containing vulnerable transports filled with tens of thousands of troops, screened only by escort carriers and destroyers there for anti-submarine patrol and ground combat support, open to an attack by a fleet of heavy Japanese surface units during the Battle off Samar. Halsey's rush off to battle created a crisis in which the Americans narrowly averted a strategic disaster.

Although the American carrier aircraft strikes caused less destruction to enemy naval vessels than earlier battles, American submarines made up for it by sinking two of the three Japanese fleet carriers. The air defense of Task Force 58 also shattered the Japanese naval air arm, a blow from which it never recovered.

The American F6F Hellcat fighter proved a capable weapon. Its powerful engine generated superior speed, and its protection and firepower made it rugged and deadly. The Japanese were still flying the A6M Zero, which though highly maneuverable and revolutionary during the early stages of the Pacific War, showed its age by 1943 standards as being underpowered and fragile, and quickly became obsolete in 1944. In addition, the D4Y "Judy", though fast, was also fragile and easily set afire. The Japanese naval airmen were also largely inadequately trained. The Japanese preparation programs could not replace the quality aviators lost during the past two years of the Pacific Campaign. Flying against the well-trained and often veteran U.S. aviators, it was a one-sided contest. The Americans lost fewer than two dozen Hellcats in air-to-air combat, and garnered nearly 480 Japanese kills, 346 of those carrier aircraft on 19 June alone.

See also

• United States Navy in World War II
• Imperial Japanese Navy of World War II
• Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service
• Z Plan (Japan)

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

Further reading

• Bryan III, Lt. Cmdr. J. Mission Beyond Darkness: The story of USS Lexington's Air Group 16 June 20, 1944 attack on the Japanese carrier fleet as told by the men who flew that day (1945)
• Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (1987).
• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
• Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3.
• Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way. U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-794-8.

External links

• Order of battle
• WW2DB: The Marianas and the Great Turkey Shoot
• Battle of the Philippine Sea at Combinedfleet.com
• Animated History of The Battle of the Philippine Sea
• The Controversy over Spruance's Decision
• Air Group 31's participation in the Battle of the Philippine Sea
• A Brief Account of the Battle