Fighter Pilots' Revolt

The Fighter Pilots' Revolt was a minor insurrection of a small group of high-ranking Luftwaffe pilots in early 1945. The pilots protested against the incompetence of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, and against the squandering of the fighter aircraft and pilots in high-loss operations like Operation Bodenplatte. Following the incident some officers were relieved of their positions. This event is poorly documented and there are few reliable sources.

Background

Bruno Loerzer (left), Adolf Galland (right) and Hermann Göring (centre), September 1940

Adolf Galland's position as Inspector of Fighters brought him into gradual conflict with the Chief of the German Air Force, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, as the war continued. In 1942–44 the German fighter forces on all fronts in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) came under increasing pressure and Galland's relationship with Göring began to sour.

During the late summer, 1943, USAAF fighters operated over German air space for the first time. Several aircraft crashed near Aachen near Germany's west border. Galland presented these wrecks as proof that the Luftwaffe faced an enemy that would soon use fighter aircraft to escort heavy bombers to industrial targets inside Germany. Galland submitted his findings to Göring. Göring was livid with Galland and the fighter force. Göring called the report the "rantings of a worn-out defeatist," and gave Galland an "order" that no Allied fighters had crossed into Germany. Göring declared that the only possible reason for the wrecked USAAF fighter was that short range fighters ran out of fuel at high altitude and "...were shot down much further west... and glided quite a distance before they crashed."

Galland stated in his autobiography that this was absurd, if an allied aircraft glided after being shot down, the pilot would ensure it glided in the opposite direction. Galland and Erhard Milch, responsible for production and procurement in the Luftwaffe, denied this and argued that they must increase fighter production to reach a three or fourfold advantage over the attackers immediately to prepare for this new threat. Galland's efforts to produce a fighter force fit for a war of attrition conflicted with Göring's bias in favour of bombers, to maintain the offensive on all fronts, an attitude the Reichsmarschall had even as late as the autumn, 1943.

By October 1943, the fractious relationship had resurfaced. Göring met Galland at Göring's estate, Schloss Veldenstein. They discussed the need for new and improved interceptor aircraft. Göring insisted that they needed large numbers of heavily cannon-armed fighters to defeat bomber formations—which Galland thought was unreasonable. Prompted by the desires of German dictator Adolf Hitler, Göring wanted cannons of some 2,000 lb in weight that fired one round per second. Galland explained that such a weapon was not effective in an aircraft. The cannon would be prone to jamming, and the weight would make the aircraft too difficult to manoeuvre. Galland also asserted that using inappropriate weaponry, such as the Messerschmitt Me 410, a favourite of Hitler's, had caused heavy losses. Galland argued such measures were deplorable and irresponsible. Göring ignored Galland's arguments and continued his frequent attacks on the fighter force, accusing them of cowardice. Galland defended them, risking his career and, near the end of the war, his life in doing so. Galland stated that he could not agree to follow Göring's plans and requested that Göring dismiss him from his post and send him back to his unit. Göring accepted, but two weeks later, he apologised to Galland and attributed his behaviour to stress. Galland continued in his post.

The arguments—mainly over aircraft procurement and armament for the defence of Germany from Allied bombing—began a growing personal rift between Göring and Galland. By 1944, the Luftwaffe had lost the air war over Europe. Göring accused and blamed the fighter pilots for the bombing of Germany and for losing the war. All of the senior Luftwaffe commanders (Geschwaderkommodores) brought their concerns to Galland.

Meeting with Göring

Galland arranged for a meeting with Göring. However, the former was not invited to this meeting. Instead, he was kept informed of the proceedings by Hannes Trautloft. The group of the most decorated Luftwaffe leaders, led by spokesman Günther Lützow, confronted Göring with a list of demands for the survival of their service. Their main concern was the Reichsmarschall's lack of understanding and unwillingness to support his pilots against accusations of cowardice and treason, which existed since the Battle of Britain.

Outcome

In 1945, blamed by Hitler and Göring for the collapse of Germany's air defense against Anglo-American bombing raids, Galland was relieved of his command. Johannes Steinhoff was threatened with court-martial and sent to Italy, and Göring told Günther Lützow that he was going to be shot for high treason. Similar penalties were imposed upon others in the so-called "mutiny". Subsequently Gordon Gollob was appointed General der Jagdflieger.

Rather than lose Galland`s undoubted abilities as a commander Göring gave him the opportunity to form his own elite Jagdverband 44 (JV 44) flying the Messerschmitt Me 262. JV 44 was also nicknamed Der Galland Zirkus (The Galland Circus); Die Jet Experten (The Jet Aces) and The Squadron of Experts. Galland was wounded in combat and Johannes Steinhoff severely burned in a takeoff accident before the end of the war. Günther Lützow was killed in action on 24 April 1945.

Participants

• Günther Lützow
• Josef Priller
• Hermann Graf
• Gustav Rödel
• Johannes Steinhoff
• Hannes Trautloft
• Eduard Neumann
• Gerhard Michalski
• Helmut Bennemann

See also

• Strategic bombing during World War II

References

Bibliography

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• Johannes Steinhoff (1995), In letzter Stunde - Verschwörung der Jagdflieger. List Verlag ISBN 3-471-78819-0
• J.Constable and R.F.Toliver, "Horrido!" Arthur Barker LTD London (1968)
• Parker, Danny S. Parker (1998), To Win the Winter Sky: The Air War Over the Ardennes, 1944-1945, Da Capo Press, ISBN 1-58097-006-0.

External links

• Interview with Adolf Galland