People’s Liberation Army (Lebanon)

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People’s Liberation Army – PLA
Participant in Lebanese civil war (1975-1990)
No image
People’s Liberation Army logo (1975-1991)
Active Until 1991
Groups Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanese National Movement
Leaders Kamal Jumblatt, Walid Jumblatt
Headquarters Baakline
Strength 17,000 fighters
Originated as 3,000 fighters
Allies Lebanese National Movement (LNM), Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), Amal Movement, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Syrian Army
Opponents Lebanese Front, Lebanese Forces, Lebanese Army, Al-Murabitoun, Amal Movement, Syrian Army, Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

The People’s Liberation Army – PLA (Arabic: Jayish al-Tahrir al-Sha’aby) or Armée de Libération Populaire (ALP) in French was the military wing of the left-wing Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which fought in the Lebanese civil war. The PSP and its militia were members of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) from 1975 to 1982.

Origins

Although the PSP was officially a secular political party, its military wing was not only well-organized, but also one of the largest sectarian militias in Lebanon. It was first founded unofficially by the Party’s president Kamal Jumblatt at the height of the 1958 civil war with a strength of about 1,000-2,000 militiamen, which fought alongside the Pan-Arab/leftist anti-government forces against the Lebanese Army, and the pro-government conservative Christian and Muslim militias in Beirut and the Chouf District.

Disbanded upon the conclusion of the war, the PSP was left without an official paramilitary branch until early 1975, when – despite Kamal Jumblatt's initial reluctance to engage in paramilitarism – the Party's leadership board decided to quietly raise a new militia force with the help of the PLO (mainly from Fatah, PFLP and DPFLP) in response to the Christian rightist Parties’ own clandestine military build-up.[1] Initial progress was slow, however, since the PSP was only able to gather a few hundred militiamen and because of the secrecy surrounding the formation of its militia, it even lacked an official title. Under Kamal Jumblatt's leadership, the PSP was a major element in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) alliance, which supported the recognition of Lebanon's Arab identity and sympathised with the Palestinians. When the Lebanese Civil War broke out in April 1975, as a member of the LNM the PSP was an active founder of the movement's military wing, the Joint Forces (LNM-JF).

In 1976, following an open appeal by Kamal Jumblatt urging Lebanese Muslim youths to join the LNM-JF militias, the PSP’s own military wing was expanded and re-organized, being officially established on August 17 of that year as the People’s Liberation Army.[2] By early 1977, the PLA mustered 3,000 lightly-armed fighters drawn from the Druze and Shia Muslim communities of the Chouf.[3][4] Other sources however, place its numbers as high as 5,000.[5]

Military structure and organisation

In 1975-77 the PLA was a predominantely infantry force, loosely organized into companies or battalions provided with light weapons drawn from PLO stocks or pilfered from LAF and ISF barracks. After suffering casualties during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon of June 1982, the PLA was quietly re-organized and expanded late that year by Walid Jumblatt, who turned it into a disciplined fighting force structured along conventional lines, with ‘Commando’, armoured, mechanized infantry and artillery units provided with Soviet-made armoured vehicles, field guns, Howitzers and MBRLs.

Headquartered at the Druze town of Baakline in the Chouf, the PSP militia by 1983 aligned 17,000 troops – 5,000 uniformed regulars, backed by 12,000 male and female reservists staffed by a qualified, Soviet-trained Officer corps. It was subsequently enlarged in the wake of the Mountain War, with the inclusion of many Druze officers and enlisted men from the Lebanese Army’s Fourth Brigade after its disintegration in September 1983.[6][7]

Weapons and equipment

Besides Palestinian and Syrian backing, the collapse of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) in January 1976 allowed the PSP/PLA to seize some weapons and vehicles from their barracks and police stations, though they received further military assistance from Libya, Iraq, East Germany and the USSR.[8] Additional weaponry, vehicles and other, non-lethal military equipments were procured in the international black market.

Armoured and transport vehicles

The PSP militia fielded by 1977 a small mechanized corps made of Staghound armoured cars and gun-trucks. The latter consisted of US Willys M38A1 MD jeeps,[9] Land-Rover series II-III, Toyota Land Cruiser (J40), Peugeot 404, GMC Sierra Custom K25/K30, and Chevrolet C-10 Cheyenne light pick-up trucks, equipped with heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, and Anti-aircraft autocannons.[10] These vehicles were partially supplanted in the early 1980s by new models, such as Toyota Land Cruiser (J70), Nissan Patrol 160-Series and Datsun 720 pick-up trucks,[11] whilst the disintegration of the Fourth Brigade allowed the PLA to seize a number of US M151 1/4-Ton 'Mutt' jeeps, Chevrolet C20 and Dodge Ram (1st generation) technicals armed with recoilless rifles and AA autocannons. They also captured seven US-made M48A5 main battle tanks (MBTs), AMX-13 light tanks, M113 APCs and Panhard AML-90 armoured cars for their own armoured corps.

The PLA’s armoured units were further strengthened in 1985 with the arrival of some 70 T-54/55 MBTs,[12] BTR-152, BTR-60 and BMP-1 APCs and ZSU-23-4 Shilka SPAAGs supplied on loan by Syria and the USSR, which they employed in the War of the Camps waged that same year against Nasserite and PLO militias in west Beirut. For logistical support, the PLA relied on Syrian-supplied Mercedes-Benz Unimog and GAZ-66 light trucks, Soviet ZIL-131 (6x6) military trucks, captured Israeli AIL M325 Command Cars (‘Nun-Nun’)[13] and US M35A2 2½-ton (6x6) military trucks.

Artillery

The PLA also fielded a powerful artillery corps equipped with obsolete Soviet ZiS-2 57mm and ZiS-3 76.2mm anti-tank guns, 122 mm howitzer 2A18 (D-30)[14] and 130 mm towed field gun M1954 (M-46) pieces,[15] along with truck-mounted BM-11 130mm and BM-21 Grad 122mm[16] and towed BM-12 (Chinese Type 63) 107mm MBRLs. Soviet KPV 14.5mm, ZPU (ZPU-1, ZPU-2, ZPU-4) 14.5mm and ZU-23-2 23mm Anti-Aircraft autocannons (mostly mounted on technicals and M113 APCs) were employed in both air defense and direct fire supporting roles. In addition to AA autocannons, the PLA received from Syria a number of man-portable, shoulder-launched Soviet SA-7 Grail surface-to-air (SAM) missiles which were used to bring down two Lebanese Air Force Hawker Hunter fighter jets during the 1983-84 Mountain War.[17]

Administrative organization and illegal activities

The stronghold of the PSP/PLA laid in the Jabal Barouk area within the Chouf, which they turned into a semi-autonomous canton in the early 1980s, known unofficially as the ‘Druze Mountain’ (Arabic: Jabal al-Duruz). Centred at the Druze town of Baakline – the PSP’s political and military HQ – the canton comprised the Chouf District proper, including the historical towns of Moukhtara (the Jumblatt family's feudal seat near Beiteddine), Deir al-Qamar, Aley, and Bhamdoun. At west Beirut, the PLA controlled since May 1985 the Druze-populated Karakol quarter, parts of Rue Hamra and a large portion of Rue Watta el-Msaytbi; the latter a small Druze street that housed the PSP’s main political offices in the capital city.

From the Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf in 1983 to the end of the civil war in 1990, the PSP ran a highly effective and well-organized civil service, the ‘Civilian Administration of the Mountain’ (CAM), in the areas under its control. The CAM was set up on 1 October 1983 at Beiteddine, headed by an eight-man supreme council that included a central committee and a general congress.[18] Its own 23 bureaus provided everything from education to medical care and also employed 2,000 seasonal workers in agricultural and industrial projects in the Chouf. To finance the administration, the PLA levied tolls on the transit trade of agricultural products and other goods at a number of in-land road checkpoints, chiefly among them Beit Mery (‘Montvert’), facing Christian-controlled east Beirut. Additional revenues were generated by smuggling and illegal gambling operations manned by a network of PSP-run Hotels and Casinos set in the Iqlim al-Kharrub coastal enclave of the western Chouf, located south of Beirut, whilst the expatriated Druze community in the United States provided financial support.

Beiteddine was also the home of the PSP/PLA media services, responsible for editing its official newspaper (Arabic: Al-Anba’a) and operated their own radio station, the "Voice of the Mountain" (Arabic: Iza’at Sawt al-Djabal) or "La Voix de la Montagne" in French.

Controversy

Historically, the Druze in Lebanon managed to maintain for centuries a small, hardy community in the Chouf Mountains overlooking Beirut surrounded by a sea of potential enemies, both Christian and Muslim, and they have a reputation of being savage fighters. However, the Lebanese Druze have also been amiable to whoever controls the Chouf region at any given time, and they were pragmatic with their dealings with foreign powers such as the Israelis, Americans and Syrians.[19]

Long-standing enemies since the 1860s, the Druze have always been at odds with the Maronites, and acts of barbarism on both sides have bedevilled their ability to co-exist for centuries past. On 16 March 1977, the PSP leader Kamal Jumblatt was ambushed and killed in his car near Baakline in the Chouf by unidentified gunmen; believing that the perpetrators were members of the Phalangist Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF) militia, PLA militiamen extracted swift retribution on the local Maronite population living in the intermixed villages around Baakline. Despite the hasty dispatch of Syrian Army troops from the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to keep the peace in the Chouf, over 100 Maronite villagers were killed in reprisal actions.[20]

During the Mountain War, the predominantely Maronite Lebanese Forces militia occupied the Chouf District and tried to impose its authority by force, allegedly killing some 145 Druze civilians at Kfar Matta in September 1983.[21] The Lebanese Forces command later accused the Druze PLA of committing ‘unprecedented massacres’ in the Chouf,[22][23] after Jumblatt’s militia forces overran between 7 and 13 September 1983 sixty-two Maronite villages, slaughtered 1,500 people and drove another 50,000 out of their homes in the mountainous areas east and west of Beirut.

See also

Notes

  1. Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), p. 2.
  2. Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), Appendix B, B-39.
  3. O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 19.
  4. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (1984), p. 77.
  5. El-Kazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon (2000), p. 302.
  6. O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 136.
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  8. El-Kazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon (2000), p. 303.
  9. El-Assad, Civil Wars Volume 1: The Gun Trucks (2008), p. 135.
  10. El-Assad, Civil Wars Volume 1: The Gun Trucks (2008), p. 129.
  11. El-Assad, Civil Wars Volume 1: The Gun Trucks (2008), p. 55-57.
  12. Jean Dunord, Liban: Les milices rendent leurs armes, RAIDS magazine (1991), p. 31.
  13. El-Assad, Civil Wars Volume 1: The Gun Trucks (2008), pp. 99-101.
  14. Éric Micheletti, Bataille d´Artillerie, RAIDS magazine (1989), p. 14.
  15. Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 105.
  16. Yann Mahé, La Guerre Civile Libanese, un chaos indescriptible! (1975-1990), Trucks & Tanks Magazine n.º41, January–February 2014, ISSN 1957-4193, p. 81.
  17. Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 106.
  18. O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 132.
  19. Katz & Volstad, Arab Armies of the Middle East Wars (2) (1988), p. 37.
  20. O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 62.
  21. O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 129, 137-138.
  22. Jago Salmon, Massacre and Mutilation: Understanding the Lebanese Forces through their use of violence, Workshop on the ‘techniques of Violence in Civil War’, PRIO, Oslo, August 20–21, 2004, p. 10, footnote 19.
  23. O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 129.

References

  • Edgar O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. ISBN 0-333-72975-7
  • Éric Micheletti and Yves Debay, Liban – dix jours aux cœur des combats, RAIDS magazine n.º41, October 1989 issue. ISSN 0769-4814 (in French)
  • Farid El-Kazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976, I. B. Tauris, London 2000. ISBN 0-674-08105-6
  • Fawwaz Traboulsi, Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain; Chapitre 12: L'économie politique des milices: le phénomène mafieux, Thèse de Doctorat d'Histoire – 1993, Université de Paris VIII, 2007. (in French)
  • Ken Guest, Lebanon, in Flashpoint! At the Front Line of Today’s Wars, Arms and Armour Press, London 1994, pp. 97–111. ISBN 1-85409-247-2
  • Moustafa El-Assad, Civil Wars Volume 1: The Gun Trucks, Blue Steel books, Sidon 2008. ISBN 9953-0-1256-8
  • Jean Dunord, Liban: Les milices rendent leurs armes, RAIDS magazine n.º65, October 1991 issue. ISSN 0769-4814 (in French)
  • Samer Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon, Beirut: Elite Group, 2003. ISBN 9953-0-0705-5
  • Samer Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon 1975-1981, Trebia Publishing, Chyah 2012. ISBN 978-9953-0-2372-4
  • Samuel M. Katz, Lee E. Russel & Ron Volstad, Armies in Lebanon 1982-84, Men-at-Arms series 165, Osprey Publishing, London 1985. ISBN 0-85045-602-9
  • Samuel M. Katz & Ron Volstad, Arab Armies of the Middle East Wars (2), Men-at-Arms series 194, Osprey Publishing, London 1988. ISBN 0-85045-800-5
  • Paul Jureidini, R. D. McLaurin, and James Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas, 1975-1978, Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Human Enginnering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Technical Memorandum 11-79, June 1979.
  • Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, fourth printing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, 1984).

External links