Operation Chenla I

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Operation Chenla I or Chenla One was a major military operation conducted by the Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK) during the Cambodian Civil War. It began on late August 1970 and ended in February 1971, due to the FANK High Command's decision to withdraw some units from Tang Kauk to protect Phnom Penh after Pochentong airbase was attacked.

Summary

In July 1970, the FANK high command decided to take advantage of a lull in North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) activity as an opportunity to raise the morale of the Cambodian Army (ANK) troops by retaking large expanses of rich rice-growing areas in northeastern Cambodia not under the Khmer Republic government control. The President of the Khmer Republic, Lon Nol, made preparations for a offensive plan codenamed 'Chenla' to be launched in late August of that same year. A ANK task-force consisting of a dozen infantry battalions supported by armour and artillery was assembled for the operation, which relied on limited ground and air support from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).[1][2]

The operation

Initially, Operation Chenla I went on as planned. The offensive began in late August, when the ANK task-force under the command of Brigadier-General Um Savuth converged on Route 6 and its objectives were two-fold: firstly, sweep away NVA and VC forces along the road and recapture the rice paddies around Kampong Cham.[3] Secondly, clear Route 7, which was repeatedly attacked by Communist forces, in order to reconnect Skoun and Kampong Thom. The ANK task-force succeeded in catching the enemy by surprise, retaking Tang Kauk during early September with ease and opened 15 miles of Route 6 for a short time;[4] the Cambodian troops then helped resettle refugees and raised local self-defense forces.

In response to this offensive, the NVA/VC forces mounted a series of counter-attacks along Route 7, intended to block the advance of the Cambodian Army units; the areas around Kompong Cham and Prey Totung saw significant fighting during the closing months of 1970. As a result of the pressure exerted by the NVA 9th Division, the Cambodian army couldn't advance further beyond Tang Kauk. South Vietnamese ARVN units then linked with the Cambodian task-force east of the Mekong River in December, allowing the Cambodian army to reopen Route 7 without making contact with enemy troops.

However, on the night of 21–22 January 1971, a hundred or so-strong NVA (Vietnamese: Dac Cong or 'Sappers') 'Commando' force managed to pass undetected through the defensive perimeter of the Special Military Region (RMS) set by the ANK around Phnom Penh and carried out a spectacular raid on Pochentong airbase, virtually annihilating the then Khmer National Aviation (AVNK) on the ground. The surrounding areas around the airbase were also targeted. President Lon Nol extended the 'State of Emergency' for another six months as some Cambodian Army units fighting at Tang Kauk were recalled and redeployed to protect Phnom Penh, effectively bringing Chenla I to an end.[5][6][7][8]

Aftermath

Despite early gains, the Cambodian military only achieved a limited strategic success; the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong still controlled a large portion of territory east of Phnom Penh. Lon Nol was evacuated by U.S. aircraft for treatment at the Tripler General Hospital in Hawaii after suffering a severe stroke.

Notes

  1. Conboy and Bowra, The War in Cambodia 1970-75 (1989), p. 6.
  2. Conboy, FANK: A History of the Cambodian Armed Forces, 1970-1975 (2011), p. 10.
  3. Conboy and Bowra, The War in Cambodia 1970-75 (1989), p. 6.
  4. Conboy and Bowra, The War in Cambodia 1970-75 (1989), p. 6.
  5. Conboy, FANK: A History of the Cambodian Armed Forces, 1970-1975 (2011), pp. 217-218; 226.
  6. Conboy and Bowra, The War in Cambodia 1970-75 (1989), pp. 19-20.
  7. Conboy, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), p. 53.
  8. Serra, L’armée nord-vietnamienne, 1954-1975 (2e partie) (2012), p. 38.

See also

References

  • Frédéric Serra, L’armée nord-vietnamienne, 1954–1975 (2e partie), in Armes Militaria Magazine n.º 322, May 2012. (in French)
  • Kenneth Conboy, FANK: A History of the Cambodian Armed Forces, 1970-1975, Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte Ltd, Djakarta 2011. ISBN 9789793780863
  • Kenneth Conboy, Kenneth Bowra, and Mike Chappell, The War in Cambodia 1970-75, Men-at-arms series 209, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1989. ISBN 0-85045-851-X
  • Kenneth Conboy, Kenneth Bowra, and Simon McCouaig, The NVA and Viet Cong, Elite 38 series, Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford 1992. ISBN 9781855321625
  • Kenneth Conboy and Simon McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces, Elite series 33, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1991. ISBN 1-85532-106-8
  • Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington 1980 [available online at http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/239/2390505001A.pdf Part 1]Part 2Part 3 Part 4.

External links