HMS Royalist (89)

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For other ships with the same name, see HMS Royalist.
HMS Royalist 1943 IWM A 19015.jpg
Royalist anchored at Greenock, in Scotland, in September 1943
History
United Kingdom
Class and type: Dido-class light cruiser
Name: HMS Royalist
Builder: Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company (Greenock, Scotland)
Laid down: 21 March 1940
Launched: 30 May 1942
Commissioned: 10 September 1943
Recommissioned: 1967
Decommissioned: November 1967
Out of service: Loaned to the Royal New Zealand Navy from 1956 to 1966
Reclassified: In reserve from 1946 to 1956
Identification: Pennant number: 89
Fate: Scrapped, Sold to Nissho Co, Japan, in November 1967. Left Auckland under tow to Osaka on 31 December 1967
History
New Zealand
Name: HMNZS Royalist
Commissioned: 1956
Decommissioned: 1966
Out of service: Returned to Royal Navy control 1967
General characteristics
Displacement:
  • 5,950 tons standard
  • 7,200 tons full load
Length:
  • 485 ft (148 m) pp
  • 512 ft (156 m) oa
Beam: 50.5 ft (15.4 m)
Draught: 14 ft (4.3 m)
Installed power: 62,000 shp (46 MW)
Propulsion:
  • Parsons geared turbines
  • Four shafts
  • Four Admiralty 3-drum boilers
Speed: 32.25 knots (60 km/h)
Range:
  • 2,414 km (1,500 miles) at 30 knots
  • 6,824 km (4,240 miles) at 16 knots
  • 1,100 tons fuel oil
Complement: 530
Armament:
Armor:
  • Original configuration:
  • Belt: 3 inch,
  • Deck: 1 inch,
  • Magazines: 2 inch,
  • Bulkheads: 1 inch.

HMS Royalist was a Dido-class light cruiser of the Bellona subgroup[Note 1] of the Royal Navy. She was a modified Dido design with only four turrets but improved anti-aircraft armament. She was built by Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company of Greenock with the keel being laid down on 21 March 1940. She was launched on 30 May 1942, and commissioned 10 September 1943.

Royal Navy career

A Supermarine Seafire of 807 Naval Air Squadron Fleet Air Arm flying above HMS Royalist during a training flight from the Royal Naval Air Station at Dekhelia, near Alexandria, in Egypt, in February 1945.

Following her commissioning, Royalist spent several months working up, during which time she underwent repairs for trial defects and for alterations and additions. Amongst these were modifications for service as a carrier flagship.[1] In March 1944 Royalist joined the Home Fleet and served for a short period in the Arctic theatre. In this capacity she took part in Operation Tungsten, the carrier raid against the German battleship Tirpitz whilst the Tirpitz was in Norway. Royalist was then ordered to the Mediterranean to support the landings in the south of France (Operation Dragoon) in August 1944, as part of the escort carrier squadron TF88.1. On 15 September, accompanied by HMS Teazer, she sank the transports KT4 and KT26 off Cape Spatha. She was then stationed in the Aegean Sea until late 1944, when she was ordered to the East Indies. By April 1945 she was with the 21st Escort Carrier Squadron as Flagship, supporting the Rangoon landings (Operation Dracula), and the following month was part of a force that unsuccessfully attempted to intercept a Japanese cruiser and destroyer evacuating troops from the Andaman Islands. For the remainder of the war she covered the carrier raids against targets in the East Indies and Sumatra.

Scottish author Alistair MacLean served on Royalist during the Second World War, and used his experiences as background for his acclaimed first novel HMS Ulysses as well as for some of his subsequent works.

Royal New Zealand Navy career

File:View from the bridge of HMNZS Royalist at Devonport Naval Base, 1956.jpg
HMNZS Royalist at the Devonport Naval Base, 1956

Royalist was withdrawn from the East Indies after the conclusion of hostilities, and returned home to Naval Reserve. In 1954 she began a major refit which was completed in April 1956. The modernisation of the Royalist was expected to be followed by similar upgrades to 4 other Dido class cruisers in the December 1951 program, HMS Phoebe, HMS Sirius to start in April 1954, HMS Diadem in June 1955 and finally, HMS Cleopatra in November 1955 ,[2] The 1952 program called for the last two Didos' reboilering, for nuclear protection.[3] The Didos were intended to be the most substantially updated war built cruisers, as the view in the 1943-49 period was the 5.25 gun was more suitable and easier to develop to provide a DP capability in the 1950s and was even intended to rearm the Colony class cruisers, because it required far less space and volume than 6 inch mounts.[4] The upgraded 5.25 inch gunnery and radar systems were seen as providing hot war capability, .[5] However the excellent performance of the RN 6 inch gun cruisers in providing shore bombardment, in the Korean war, vitally, when McArthur landed at Inchon in 1950,[6] the longer range of the Town class cruisers, and in particular, the 1955 decision to put in reserve, the last battleship, HMS Vanguard, which with a secondary 5.25 inch armament had been planned to lead the Dido cruiser squadron in anti Sverdlov cruiser actions.

The ship was handed over to the Royal New Zealand Navy on 9 July 1956. When Captain Phipps went to take command of the Royalist in 1955, New Zealand diplomat Frank Corner was shocked to find that Phipps agreed that the Royalist was a white elephant and completely unsuitable for use by the RNZN in the Pacific; she had limited range so could not get as far as Tahiti without refueling. The British Treasury had objected to the extra expense of renovating the ship . "Then Whitehall thought of New Zealand!"[7] However First Lord Mountbatten disagreed, publicly defending Royalist as the modern modern British cruiser in Auckland when it arrived in 1956 [8] and regarded Phipps as inexperienced and unsuitable.[9] The Royalist would, in fact have been reactivated for Suez service, regardless, as essential for the RN in Musketeer, its modernization, for Aircraft direction of RN carrier fighters and bombers, and AW, communication and CIWS was ideal for likely future operations of the RN Carriers focused on the Indian Ocean and SE Asia till 1971. Auckland and the RNZN base was the logical logistics base to operate and maintain Royalist.,[10] NZ was used to the Dido and the most loyal ally. Royalist was perfect name for a NZ and the RNZN warship then, if not for NZ Diplomats like Corner who rejected colonialism and priority given to traditional defense relations, ahead of the UN, for doubtful regional and economic benefits The fact is that the Type 12 , that Phipps wanted were ordered for the RNZN early in 1957, was even more short ranged, and the Royalist transit speed to escort Pacific convoys was 18 knots, compared with the Type 12s ability to just cover the leg from Suva to Honolulu, at low, most economical speed and, it was arguable the traditional cruiser role in trade defence, against Russian cruisers was still relevant,[11] than the questionable submarine threat.

After refitting, she was re-equipped with new equipment for her role as an AA and AD escort ship for carriers, and 5.25-inch rather than the usual 6-inch (or 4-inch) guns. However RN and British Defence documents released under the 30 year rule, show the Royalists refit was to prepare it for all-out hot wars and high-level gun engagement of shadowers [12] whereas the British colony class frigates and Belfast were modernised for colonial visits and shore bombardment. The Royalists complement was 600 against the 550 of the Bellona, and with extra equipment the larger crew had to be accommodated in less space. This was because the all the Royalists turrets were manned where the British Colony and Town class cruisers in the 1950s usually operated with a crew of only 650 and with gun crews for only one of their three main turrets. Fully manned with a crew of a 1000 a Colony or Town cruiser would also have been as crowded and fetid.

The transfer of the Royalist to the New Zealand was partly a bookkeeping manoeuvre, as the RNZN was assumed by the British chiefs and Government to be an extension of the RN and almost automatically follow British command. Around 25% of the officers on the Royalist were RN officers on loan or exchange, as were many of the specialist ratings and, the RNZN officers on the cruiser were usually more junior and had lengthy training with the RN in the UK. Even on the Royalists final deployment in 1965 on Confrontation patrols in SE Asia the higher rank officer positions still included many RN and RAN officers [13] In the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force many high positions in 1956 were held by NZ-born subjects, including some in relation to the Mediterranean . NZ was used to operating Dido class cruisers and substantial stocks of 5.25 ammunition remained in Europe for the Vanguard in reserve, until 1960 and new 5.25 shore mountings for defence of Gibraltar. The four Modernised 5.25 RP10 turrets, firing at a max 8-10rpm, potentially a total of 72-80rpm equalled the new RN Tiger class cruisers performance in the main intended new roles under the South East Asian Command of AA and support of amphibious operations by the new RN Commando Carriers.

New Zealand prime minister Sidney Holland in private correspondence with British PM Anthony Eden approved the Royalists use in Middle East Conflicts in 1956 as long as the New Zealand public didn't find out as documented by leading Cambridge and US Historians Correlli Barnett and Kyle.[14] where her role could have been protecting the British fleet against Israeli Mystere jets if Britain was supporting Jordan against Israel (Cordage) rather than any use against Egypt (Musketeer).[15] The UK government didn't remove, Holland's letters and phone data from the records,[16] and released them and it was the view of the RN and the First Lord Earl Mountbatten that that NZ was an active and knowing party to the action, and Phipps was too inexperienced and responsive to uninformed and junior NZ diplomats[citation needed] After working up in UK waters, the Royalist was operational with the British fleet in the Mediterranean as the fleet built up with the possibility of action against Nasser and the Soviet Equipped Egyptian air force. The idea that would have been used against the Israeli Air Force may have been the information originally supplied to the RNZN, but is unlikely. The Royalist was intended to be mainly a radar picket and aircraft direction ship for the RAF Canberras and RN Carrier based Seahawks and Sea Venoms. The Royalist had the standard RN long range airwarning 960 radar carried by other British cruisers and carriers in the area but Royalist was somewhat better equipped for aircraft direction than the other cruisers and destroyers in the area. The Royalist had a rather more accurate and reliable MK 6 275 radar for the direction of its 5.25 guns than the older version used on other British cruiser or their secondary MRS1 4 inch directors. The British carrier Eagle did have a good earlier US sourced 275 and the backup long range and over land 982/983 radar combination also used by the other carriers but the 982 radar on the carriers was still somewhat experimental. After hostilities with Egypt commenced under the false pretext of the arranged invasion by Israel of Sinai and Egypt's counter move. The international outrage caused Holland to reverse his support for UK and in some eyes to establish NZ independence by calling for Captain Peter Phipps to withdraw from operations against Egypt and bombardment duties it was scheduled to conduct with a Daring squadron. However Neilland states the NZ Cruiser 'Black Swan'(sic) was often seen "[17] The other RN cruiser in the area HMS Jamaica had WW2 AW/AD and it was days till, modernised sister, HMS Ceylon, recommissioned a month earlier [18] assumed the picket having given 25 minutes, 6 inch fire support to the landing at Port Said on 31-10.[19] It is unclear whether Phipps immediately complied completely or whether the Royalist continued to assist the RN fleet in a passive role with aircraft direction and air-warning. K.Kyle.[20] considers Holland and the NZ cabinet, officially ordered a withdrawal from operations, but allowed the cruiser to stay with the Operation Musketeer fleet, as " there was insufficient time for a decision not to withdraw."(quote) [21] an apparent non decision,[22] which was probably a continuation of support for kith and Kin through 'thick and thin' [23] with maximum deniability in the face of NZ Foreign Service and the NZ Opp view that NZ faced a significant risk of being tried for aggression with the UK and France before the UN Security Council.[24] Much of the Soviet-supplied Badgers and Migs of the Egyptian Air Force were still intact and a threat to the RN fleet. A RNZN radar operators on the ship in the Med, insist that it was heavily involved in the action [25] In the 2000s the New Zealand Labour Government and the RNZN saw those personnel were awarded battle honours for war service in the Mediterranean. The Royalists' log for the crucial days of the Suez War was destroyed at the time - and the entire truth is not knowable.

In early 1957, Royalist was involved in exercises with the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.[26]

In 1962, the still joint crewed RNZN/RAN/RN Royalist suffered serious damage proceeding at high speed in rough sea conditions through the Tasman to get to a six test series between the Wallabies and All Blacks at Eden Park.[citation needed]The cruiser operated with the British Far East fleet, in three tours of duty in 1963, 1964 & 1965, during the Confrontation. In the 1964 deployment the Royalist, out of Singapore returning to Auckland, via the Cairns races in Queensland transited the Carmat Straights on 15 July, Sapud on 16 July and the Lombok Straight on July 17, 1964 [27] on what was described as 'routine passage' in the highly confidential flash to Canberra. During the 6 hour passage, HMNZS Royalist went through the Sapud straights, at 11.45pm on 16 July in condition X Ray,[28] a high state of nuclear readiness, passing Balli at about 2.20am and through the Lombak Straights at about 4.20.am, during this crucial transit the log entry notes several time that the X gyro is unservicable and the A gyro is only servicable from about 2.00am to 3.47am,[29] this probably indicates that several of the turrets were not working and that the gunnery fire control lock and follow tracking system and associated stabalised 5.25 turrets were often not effective, during the dangerous transit, but were in operation, firing ammunition and starshells to show other vessels at times. The Royalist crew have recently been awarded general service medals by the NZ Government for the 1963 and 1964 South East Asia tours, for the period ending 17 July 1964, with the transit through Lombok. It appears HMS Victorious travelled to Australia a few days late and its advertised later transit of the straights two months later with the Royal Naval battlefleet is regarded as a moment of maximumn danger in the cold war rivalling the Cuban missile crisis. British cruisers, transiting these strategic straights, during the periods of great tension during the confrontation would sometimes fire their guns, in a demonstration of British power and HMS Royalist, 5.25 turrets were more reliable, for such crucial shows of strength than the more modern Tiger class cruisers, which 6 inch automatic guns, often jammed if fired for more than 30 seconds There was considerable doubt among RNZN staff, whether the Royalist,which had not had a major refit since its modernisation in 1956, could deploy again in 1965, again after a 7 week 24/7 refit of intense work in the Devonport dockyard and work up in the Hauraki Gulf where it managed 27 knots at full half power, without full briefing of COMFarEast, of the increasing inaccuracy of the two Mk6m 275 fire control systems, particularly in the shore bombardment role. However the gunnery systems, with the use of splash spotting radar, to adjust range and bearing, could probably still engage, the 600 feet long, ex Soviet cruiser or destroyer, the Indonesians might deploy, which Moscow had given to Indonesia in 1962 and refitted in 1964. As intended the ex Soviet Sverdlov class cruiser seems to have succeeded partially in deterring operations by Dutch gun cruisers in Indonesian waters.[30] The cruiser was still visually impressive, and provided the crucial appearance of capability and ability to operate It was judged the fire control systems needed either either a years refit or $140,000 new parts ,[31] and one of two STAAG CIWS mounts was refitted with the rather worn spare, after rust removal, the 2 UA3 ESM systems were playing up,[32] and it was hoped the worn steam turbines could last 15 months to allow ,after a final 1966 visit to all the NZ Ports if 'hope prevailed over fear'. Against most RNZN staff advice it was decided not to inform the Commander of the British Far East Fleet, of the Royalist situation as " Commander Far East has enough trouble fitting Royalist in his operational plans now with limitations on his main capability in the Confrontation War".[33] However the Royal Navy was desperately overstretched during the confrontation, and keeping one carrier fully operational in the theatre at all times was very difficult,[34] to deter Djkarta with the deterrence of potential nuclear strike from the S1 Buccaneer, meant, keeping only one of the high maintenance, Tiger class cruisers, with the Far East fleet in 1964-5, and it was decided the Royalist would proceed to Pearl Harbour for a second workup, as planned rather than refit longer in the Devonport dockyard, before deploying to HK and Singapore. The Royalist conducted anti infiltration patrols, boarding boats, put patrols on shore, participated in Exercise Guardrail and deployed to give AD support of the Commando Helicopters of HMS Bulwark for a week.[35] For the 1965 far east tour in a period of increasing tension, the crew were awarded Operational Service Medals (OPSM). The deployment was somewhat marked by the refusal of the NZ External affairs or the NZ or British ambassador to allow the Royalist to dock with RN Warships, in the Tokyo or Yokohama area [36] as according to the RN attache at Tokyo, the RNZN sailors 'could not afford the 1 pound a minute price in the Ginza nightclubs and bars' [37] The Captain of the Royalist J.P . Vallant replied to the Deputy Secretary of Defence in Wellington, ' find it quaint that the flagship of the NZ navy is persona non grata in the Tokyo Bay area'.[38] Published memoirs of NZ diplomats in the 1960's refer to a shocking behaviour at a 1962 diplomatic function attended by HMNZS Royalist crew, after the daily rum ration and third drink, and little sleep in the inferno of Royalists, lower deck,.[39] On a Dido cruiser,in the tropics, sleep was never possible, except for officers with a deck cabin. HMNZS Royalist was confined to the Japanese provincial ports were the NZ diplomat persuaded the local police chiefs that, their request for a curfew was unwise and it was essential to keep bars open 24 hours.[40] After furthur RR in Bangkok, Singapore, Subic Bay the Royalist made it back to NZ, after a valiant repair of a milking boiler and turbine, but was unable to make its final scheduled 1966 visit to Waitangi day and tour of the NZ Ports, and effectively paid off 5 months early.

Decommissioning and fate

Royalist was paid off on 4 June 1966. After eleven years in the RNZN, Royalist reverted to Royal Navy control in 1967. She was sold for scrap to the Nissho Co, Japan, in November 1967 and was towed from Auckland to Osaka on 31 December 1967.

Notes

  1. ↑ The Bellona sub-group were also known as Dido group 2

References

  1. ↑ Mason, naval-history.net
  2. ↑ N. Freidman. British Cruisers. To World Wars & After. Seaforth, Barnsley (2010),p 284
  3. ↑ N.Freidman. British Cruisers(2010)p 287,
  4. ↑ D. Muffin. AA to AA. The Fiji's Turn Full Circle in Warship 2010. London and N.Freidman. British Cruisers. Two World wars and After. Seaforth.(2010)London.
  5. ↑ E. Grove. The Royal Navy. RN since 1815. A New Short History. Palgrave MacMillan (2005)Basingstoke, p225.
  6. ↑ E. Grove. The Royal Navy. Short History. Palgrave (2005) Basingstoke, p 219
  7. ↑ Unofficial Channels: Letters between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner 1946-1966 ed, Ian McGibbon, VUP,(1999) Wellington, p186. ISBN 0-86473-365-8 and Ties of Blood and Empire:New Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis 1947-57 by Malcolm Templeton, page 124 (1994, Auckland University Press, Auckland NZ) ISBN 1-86940-097-6
  8. ↑ RNZ.Yesterdays.Sat Evening.NZ Sound Archives
  9. ↑ Unofficial Channels.ed I. McGibbon. VUP.(1999)
  10. ↑ The UK Treasury and the RN was always keen till the Thatcher era to transfer to NZ the cost of refit, cost blow outs or repairing serious action damage,often in the case of warships they decided to retain, e.g., offer, HMS Lincoln (1973),Yarmouth (1976) and Dido (1981) Info supplied NZDF, circa 86 to writer on ship offers RN/USN
  11. ↑ A. Clarke. 'Sverdlov Class Cruisers and the Royal Navy Response'. British Naval History, 12 May 2014 (website), retrieved 3 November 2015
  12. ↑ E Grove. Royal Navy since 1815. A Short History. Palgrave-MacMillan.(2006) London
  13. ↑ C. Pugsley. From Emergency to Confrontation. The NZ Armed Forces in Malaysia and Borneo 1949-66. OUP (2003) NZ/Au.
  14. ↑ Correlli Barnett. The Verdict of Peace. Britain between Yesterday and the Future. MacMillan. (2001)London, p487 ; Keith Kyle. Suez. St Martins Press. (1991) NY, p 159 and T Earys. The Commonwealth Connection and Suez. (1964)OUP , p 15-16, 60
  15. ↑ Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis 1947-57 by Malcolm Templeton, pages 130-1 (1994, Auckland University Press, Auckland NZ) ISBN 1-86940-097-6
  16. ↑ ADM 116/ 6097 14-8-56
  17. ↑ Furthur GFS by heavier than 4.5 guns was stopped by C in C Med order 6-11-56 cited by R. Neillands. A Fighting Retreat. British Empire.1947-97. Hodder & Stoughton. (1996) London, 313
  18. ↑ P.Catterall ed. MacMillan Diaries 1950-57. MacMillan. (2003) London states that as of Ch Exch, H.MacMillan asked the Admiralty on 5-8-56 to make all old cruisers they could find available for service in the Mediterranean
  19. ↑ Ltd A. Briggs, Communication officer,Ceylon. IMPWMuseum audio
  20. ↑ K.Kyle. Suez. 1991, p394-95
  21. ↑ Keith Kyle. Suez. 1991, p 395
  22. ↑ K. Kyle, p394 ,
  23. ↑ Holland-Eden 56
  24. ↑ Kyle, p 394
  25. ↑ phone interviews mid 1990s,NZ with Royalist Radar crews (56-65), and on the return voyage to New Zealand via South Africa Captain Phipps told the crew they deserved the recognition given to RN personnel for their involvement in the incident.
  26. ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  27. ↑ NCB 083-PL 70R 18762 RLA 8-7-64
  28. ↑ HMNZS Royalist Log July 1964, 16-07-64
  29. ↑ HMNZS Royalist Log July 1964,17-07-64
  30. ↑ Global Security. Indonesian Navy- Living Dangerously under Sukarno. Retrieved 3 November 2015
  31. ↑ Reports and Returns. Mod Pre & Post refit trials ;(1) 1955-64 & (2) 1965 Rc 72/1/10 ,
  32. ↑ Reports & Returns, Mod & Refit.1965. 72/1/10 ,
  33. ↑ Reports & Returns. Mod & Refit. !955-64 & 65. 72/1/10
  34. ↑ Admiral F. Twiss. Social Change in the Royal Navy 1924-1970. The Life and Times of Admiral Frank Twiss. Sutton. UK(1996)
  35. ↑ HMNZS Royalist 1965 Log
  36. ↑ Report & Return HMNZS Royalist 1965.R 72/1/10 NZ National Archives, Wgtn, NZ(Open access))
  37. ↑ HMNZS Royalist. Reports & Return. 1965. NZ National Archives. R 72/ 1/10 Wgtn, NZ.
  38. ↑ Cpt. J.P.Vallant.. HMNZS Royalist.Reports & Returns. 1965. 72/1/10.
  39. ↑ A.McLean. Ulysses
  40. ↑ Reports & Returns. HMNZS Royalist. 1965. R 72/1/10
General

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